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The Editors
ARMS & INFLATION
THE POPE'S TOUCH

ONE DOLLAR

JUNE 5, 1981



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Correspondence

What the married know

Washington, D.C.

To the Editors: John Garvey writes [Mar. 27] that "the consensus of millions of lay people and clergy is simply that the members of the hierarchy who back *Humanae Vitae* are wrong." So *Humanae Vitae* is wrong because these people think it is wrong. According to this statement morality is subjective, and that is not the Catholic morality I learned in theology.

(REV.) MAURICE FITZGERALD, C.S.P.

Washington, D.C.

To the Editors: John Garvey's complaints about the pope's "two voices" [Mar. 27] remind me of the secular columnists who continue to find John Paul II an enigma: "How can he be so liberal on social justice," they ask, "and so conservative on things like contraception and abortion?" It does not occur to them for a moment that it might be their own ideological labels that are inapplicable or incoherent. As far as I can tell, the pope's statements on morality, politics, and social justice all flow from a synthetic grasp of a few fundamental Christian principles: the sanctity of human life and of married human love, for instance. Mr. Garvey's refusal to appreciate the consistency of this synthesis must be due to a refusal to listen, for the connections which the pope sees among the various issues are drawn very clearly in each of his talks; Mr. Garvey's refusal to appreciate the spiritual and personal force with which this consistency is being presented is perplexing to me, because I find John Paul II to be a very appealing and charismatic leader indeed.

The most distressing thing to me personally about Mr. Garvey's article, however, is that he seems to be putting words into my mouth. I mean his comment that "married people know that he [the pope] is wrong when he talks about contraception." This married person knows nothing of the sort. Since he presents no new evidence to support his claim, I assume Mr. Garvey is referring to the famous Westoff survey cited by Archbishop Quinn at the recent synod, in which it was apparently shown that 70 percent of married American Catholics in 1975 had used a contraceptive at least once. To show that his claim about what "married people know," then, Mr. Garvey need only demonstrate the truth of all his unspoken assumptions: that this situation has not improved during the last six years, at a time when use of the Pill has dropped drastically in the U.S. and interest in natural family planning has grown dramatically; that one-time use equals consistent use; that consistent use equals a conviction that *Humanae Vitae* is objectively wrong; that 70 percent of married American Catholics make up all the married people in the world; and that "thinking" equals "knowing" when enough people think the same thing. If he has time left over, Mr. Garvey might explain to me why the most articulate defenders of *Humanae Vitae* in the U.S. are married laymen (e.g., William May, Germain Grisez, Joseph Boyle, John Kippley), while its most vocal opponents are celibates.

Incidentally, just in case Mr. Garvey plans to run another thumbnail survey on what "married people know" about his proposal for a married clergy, I would like to place my vote now against such a step — not so much because it would diminish the priesthood (though it obviously would, since the demands of family life would necessarily make the priesthood into a part-time job), but because it would diminish matrimony. It would imply that the married state is a mere condition of life rather than a distinct personal vocation in its own right, with its own spiritual meaning and responsibilities. Mr. Garvey may not understand why I oppose his idea as an attack upon my vocation, but then he probably wouldn't understand how tired I am of a celibate clergy assuring me of the joys of contraceptive intercourse either.

RICHARD DOERFLINGER

The author replies:

Obviously Mr. Doerflinger and I are very far apart. Like him I find John Paul II appealing and charismatic; unlike him, I do not find John Paul's views on celibacy or contraception persuasive. (Abortion is another matter.) Polls are less to the point than the well-documented history of the encyclical itself. *Humanae Vitae* was issued only after a commission had been appointed to look into the question of the church's traditional ban on artificial birth control. This was certainly a sign that the traditional teaching was far from settled. The commission, which included conservatives as well as liberals, leaned towards a change in the teaching. The Vatican decided to act as if this were all beside the point and issued *Humanae Vitae*. The major flaw in the traditional argument came with permission to use natural family planning: a contraceptive mentality was allowed here, because while natural family planning may theoretically leave sexual intercourse open to the transmission of life, the people practicing it obviously hope with all their hearts that this transmission won't happen. The use of time to prevent conception is as much a use of something physical (unless you want to ignore physics in talking about the physical) as the use of a rubber membrane; and there is something quite artificial about timed intercourse. In any case, Mr. Doerflinger is just plain wrong when he says that the most vocal defenders of contraception are celibates. Most celibates have the good grace to be silent on the subject; those who do speak about it tend to support the teaching of *Humanae Vitae*, though there are some exceptions. As far as the attitude of married people is concerned, all the evidence points to the conclusion that most American Catholic

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PRESIDENT REAGAN'S DANGEROUS MIXTURE

A FUNNY THING happened to the Reagan budget when it was sent to Congress: it passed. And it passed with most of the public discussion centered on the cuts in social programs and relatively little on the huge jump in military spending, with all that this could mean for the cause of world peace. Congressional consideration will soon turn to the proposed Reagan tax cuts, and perhaps now some attention will be paid, at least to the economic consequences of the escalation in Pentagon spending when combined with the proposed tax cuts.

The nub of President Reagan's proposal is a three-year, ten percent annual cut in the personal tax rate, at an estimated cost of $44 billion in the first year alone, plus almost $10 billion more in business cuts. The Democrats are urging one cautious step at a time, and their main alternative proposal calls for a one-year, $28 billion tax cut, targeted more directly at low- and moderate-income families. Despite the ease with which the Reagan budget gained approval in both House and Senate, an increasing number of moderate Republicans are beginning to share Democratic worries about the size and extended duration of the Reagan tax plan. They too read the financial pages, and they know that more and more of those who run the nation's financial markets have qualms about scheduling heavy tax cuts three years in advance; they are increasingly worried about the effect of the Reagan tax plan on inflation and high interest rates. Giving additional substance to such fears is a recent report from the Brookings Institution. Supply-side supporters of the administration tax proposal argue that reducing individual tax rates will have a significant effect on incentives to work and save. But the Brookings study of the pattern in past tax cuts indicates that although such cuts may have some effect on how long or how hard people work, they would not raise output sufficiently to offset the cost to the treasury, "even with the most generous estimates of the total labor supply response."

In weighing the impact of the proposed three-year tax cuts, Reagan's plans for military spending are a crucial factor. Here the figures are scary, far exceeding the savings achieved by slashing social programs. The United States is already spending twenty-five percent of its national budget on military spending. Mr. Reagan's plans would boost that sum to close to forty percent. The projected figures: $162 billion for 1981, $189 billion for 1982, $226 billion for 1983, $256 billion for 1984, $304 billion for 1985, $343 billion for 1986. What this means is that the Reagan administration plans to increase defense spending in the next three years by a sum greater than the entire military budget for 1978. Stated in constant dollars, that increase would be three times larger than the Vietnam war buildup — a buildup that many economists think started our present inflationary spiral because President Johnson feared to raise taxes to pay for an unpopular war. Or, to put the matter another way: suppose the supply-side expectations of pronounced economic growth

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did not eventuate after the administration tax plan went into effect, Mr. Reagan's tax cuts and military hikes together would amount to far more than his budget cuts in social spending. The result: not a balanced budget in 1984 but a deficit of as much as $100 billion.

As if that were not bad enough, the Congressional Budget Office says the projected administration estimates for military spending are in fact underestimated because in planning to spend roughly $1.5 trillion on the military in the five fiscal years ending in 1986, the president's program allows too little for inflation. The Reagan people base their figures on the calculation that the inflation rate will shrink to less than five percent in that period. The Congressional Budget Office thinks this is too optimistic; its estimate of military spending is based on an average inflation rate only two percentage points higher than that used by the administration. The result: an escalation in costs by a whopping $136 billion, an overrun that Congressman Jack Brooks of the House Government Operations committee said would be "devastating" to the federal budget, numerous social programs, and the economy as a whole.

If the Congressional Budget Office is correct in its estimates, the Department of Defense is simply following a long-established practice in this matter. For many years, under Democrats and Republicans alike, the DOD has calculated the impact of inflation on its purchases not on the basis of Pentagon and defense contractors' experience, but on the basis of rates drawn from the economy as a whole, which are considerably lower. Furthermore, this method of calculating military costs is made even worse than usual by the fact that Reagan administration predictions of inflation for the economy as a whole are highly optimistic, being substantially lower than any anticipated by reputable private forecasting firms, let alone the Congressional Budget Office. And as a spokesman for the CBO pointed out, the next five troubled years could turn out to be even worse than historical experience already suggests, especially if instability in the Middle East, bad weather, or some other uncontrollable factor causes sharp price increases in commodities bought in large quantities by the military, such as oil, food, and exotic metals.

Is the Congressional Budget Office being too pessimistic? Experience suggests not. According to a top official in the General Accounting Office, past Pentagon projections of inflation rates even three years in advance turned out to be less than half the actual rates, and prices paid by the DOD to buy major weapons systems and military supplies have always increased faster than prices in general. Indeed, overly sanguine inflation projections by the Pentagon accounted for as much as thirty percent of cost increases in major weapons systems. In the last quarter of 1980 the price of forty-seven major weapons systems increased by over $47 billion, according to Morton Mintz of the *Washington Post* (a sum, it should be noted, roughly equal to the budget cuts in programs for the poor), and nearly $14 billion of that sum was due to faulty inflation estimates, according to the General Accounting Office. What reason is there to expect that current Pentagon estimates are any more accurate, made worse as they are by the low Reagan administration estimates for the economy as a whole? Add realistic inflationary estimates to Mr. Reagan's already huge military budget, combine these with his proposed across-the-board, three-year tax cuts, and how can the result have anything but a tremendously inflationary impact on the American economy? Reagan spokesmen are adamant on their plans for enormous increases in military spending, apparently counting on a strong anti-Soviet mood in the country, but under pressure they are beginning to talk of possible modifications in their tax plan. Moderates in Congress should take advantage of this fact and of public worry as evidenced in the opinion polls and insist on cutting the size and scope of the Reagan plan.

HEART—AND MIND

What would we have missed had Mehmet Ali Agca's bullets removed Pope John Paul II from sight — and touch? How natural it is for us to think of Karol Wojtyla in terms of touch! Is it just that irrepressible personality? The moral teacher? The vigorous defender of human rights? Or maybe the papal theater? Yes, perhaps the theater, and a special kind of drama.

People will of course differ, but curiously enough we suspect the man's near-universal appeal, even when one disagrees with some of his statements, has much to do with with his almost shamanistic capacity to trigger an awareness in people that God's glory has suddenly come to earth. TV actually rarely captures the intensity of the pope's road show. It's often as if "reality" and "imagination" were reversed; as if, but for a moment, the substance of things hoped for were securely in place — the ritual meal spread, and all the hungry welcome. Theater indeed.

In the secularized West, the pope's appeal is far different than it is in the traditional societies of East and South. In both parts of the world but for different reasons, the response will be ambivalent. However much the pope is honored as a vicar of God in non-Western traditional cultures, there will be the taint of representing a Western conception of God — and the link to a colonial past. In Western cultures, on the other hand, where transcendence is either privatized or repressed, the pope's presence makes many nervous. Centuries of church-state struggle, the scientific revolution, and the Enlightenment behind us — or at least behind our elites — the pope's blessing or curse may still affect individual Catholics, but Western leaders no longer seek his imprimatur. So far as public discourse is concerned, we hardly have categories any longer to discuss the disconcerting aura a charismatic pope like John Paul II carries. So he's conveniently reduced in the press to a moral authority, a Renaissance Norman Vincent Peale.

Yet it is curious. When John Paul visited this country in the Fall of 1979, the response suggested the nation hid more closet religious "primitives" than one would have supposed. Predictably, the pope's strict moral lectures — and later, the Küng affair — went down hard, for many Catholics as well as for interested outsiders. But something very deep remained, some subsurface synapse he touched in the American nervous system. And our guess is that his staying power in American

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minds had everything to do with the pope, this pope, as a master ritualist, as the leader of a particular kind of cosmic parade, and a particular kind of street-theater that Americans had almost forgotten existed. His genuinely charismatic presence in those vast public liturgies seemed to address some great repressed need in countless numbers of people, many of them non-Catholic. It was as if, for a forgetful moment, people bathed in a glory which supposed he *was* in fact the vicar of God's word made flesh. And found there a father's face telling them the cosmos *is*, after all, well-pleased they're alive and kicking. "My life is not important," Mehmet Ali Agca is reported to have said. The irony is that those present at John Paul's street-theater know differently.

A lot too smugly, much of our therapeutic culture calls the transaction here either "regression" or a "return of the repressed." But these are strange terms to name that burst of self-worth experienced by many faceless individuals in a crowd — who understand themselves, if only for a glorious moment, as meaning something great and good in the vast universe, something that Carl Sagan's biologism won't ordinarily let them mean. What's properly feared in all this, remembering the enchanting reflected glory drunk up by Hitler's Germans or Stalin's party commissars, is that such magic can entrance, play on our worst fears, expunge the critical mind. And that's why it is important that it be known that the pope also stands behind the Western critical intellectual tradition. At its best, Catholicism has striven to keep alive and in tension these two deep matters — the ineradicable child's heart unafraid to seek a father's blessing, and the equally insistent claim of the mind to understand what sort of universe we dwell in. Somehow, this vigorous Polish pope evokes the one, and symbolizes an answer to the second. In both ways we are touched far beneath the skin.

IN DUBIOUS BOTTLE

Why must American citizens be humiliated by their own government? That is the harsh question that comes to mind in the wake of the administration's vote, in the company of two right-wing dictatorships, against an international code, proposed in the UN's World Health Assembly, to regulate the marketing of breastmilk substitutes. This code was developed after a decade of warnings that the promotional activities of infant formula manufacturers were contributing to the dangerous decline in traditional breastfeeding practices, a decline that may be responsible for the deaths of millions of infants in developing nations. We have read the code; and quite apart from being totally subject to modification or non-enforcement by World Health Organization nations, it is overall a moderate and cautious document, obviously a compromise, in part due to manufacturers' lobbying, from a stronger draft. The baby food multinationals have nonetheless persisted in their opposition, relying on a number of highly questionable arguments.

According to the manufacturers, there is no conclusive proof that any significant percentage of the damage done by the decline in breastfeeding is due to the use of their products or the impact of their marketing. It is true that there is a paucity of scientifically controlled studies. There is *merely* the "clinical" evidence submitted by health workers all over the globe.

According to the manufacturers, groups opposing infant formula promotion have made inflamatory claims out of anti-capitalist motives. The manufacturers, therefore, feel justified in undertaking low-profile but well-funded attempts to influence the media and gain credibility through the support of sympathetic intellectual promoters like Ernest W. Lefever and his Washington Ethics and Public Policy Center. The anti-bottlefeeding advocates have sometimes engaged in the kind of oversimplification characteristic in political mobilization; but the manufacturers' double standard is patent. It is, after all, oversimplified and (in the past) sometimes deceptive advertising they are determined to protect. They insist that their opponents abide by the same standards they object to having applied to themselves.

According to the manufacturers, the code threatens freedom of commerce and, because of restrictions on advertising, freedom of speech. The problems in this area strike us as ones that have been confronted for a long time with the regulation of food labelling, the marketing of drugs, and cigarette advertising. Sound policies always involve a balancing of considerations. One would think that the health and survival of infants would weigh heavily in such a balancing.

Acting at the prompting of the manufacturers, the American government voted against an imperfect but pragmatic code that both it and the companies had helped to draft. It did so despite the obvious bad politics and the loss to America's reputation throughout the world. The government has misrepresented the nation. An ungenerous ideology may be the mother's milk of this administration—but not, we believe, the U.S.

Report from Britain

WHY LABOR SPLIT

REPRESENTATION & ACCOUNTABILITY

IN ORDER to follow the present troubles in the Labor party it is necessary for the reader to understand some of its essential structural features. One can divide the significant elements of the Labor party organization into three groups. First of all there are the constituency Labor party organizations. These are local bodies of active party members in each of the parliamentary constituencies which elect M.P.s throughout the country. They are made up of thousands of volunteers who have paid their subscriptions to the party and who do most the work of keeping electors in touch with party matters and of getting out the vote at election times. It is not surprising, therefore, that the people who hold the key to Labor party power in the constituency parties are those most alive to the social ideals of the party. In recent years that means

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a tendency to be more radical and "left-wing," precisely because it is the radicals who have the enthusiasm and the determination to keep things going through thick and thin.

Secondly, there are the trade unions, most of which are affiliated with the party and a portion of whose members' subscriptions goes directly into Labor party funds. The trade unions in Britain are the bankers of the party and because they hold the purse strings they possess a great deal of the power. But politically speaking trade-unions are a very varied set of forces. The top trade union leaders are far from being unanimously radical, let alone revolutionary. Many of them are among the most conservative and traditional of the party's leading members, and as a whole they split very evenly across the whole spectrum of party opinion. A second major source of their power in the Labor party, apart from finance, rests on the fact that their members are automatically affiliated with the party unless they choose to "contract out"; and this means that the trade unions wield immense "bloc-votes" which can be put into play at national conferences.

Thirdly, one has to take account of the Labor M.P.s in the House of Commons. These obviously vary in number from election to election, but they constitute the pinnacle of the party's organization; and because they are at the center of legislative power they inevitably have a key place in the party organization and structure. Many of them are sponsored by trade unions, but even so they have to be selected (or removed) by the committees of the local constituency parties. On the whole the M.P.s in the House of Commons are less radical in their outlook than the constituency members, or indeed many trade union leaders. They have had to learn the hard way that politics is the art of the possible.

The key committee of the party as a whole is the National Executive Committee, which is elected to run the party organization and to determine general lines of party action. The committee is largely composed of trade union leaders and M.P.s but not exclusively so. It is chaired by the leader of the party.

The labor party conference is the one national annual get-together of representatives of the whole party. Because it is at the conferences that constituency party members are best able to make their voices heard at the national level, and because the M.P.s are heavily outnumbered by other groups, the tendency has always been for the resolutions passed at the conferences to be of a more radical nature than the general policy of the party as a whole. For example, in the early 1960s a famous resolution was passed which committed the party to unilateral disarmament for Britain; and it was on this decision that Hugh Gaitskell, then leader of the party, vowed to oppose the conference resolution, and to "fight, fight, and fight again" to reverse the party's conference commitment on this issue.

Underlying the present turmoil, the basic question is that of the balance between these various groups. The British constitution is such that there is inevitably a tension between the role of the M.P., as a representative of those who elected him, and his or her role as somebody chosen to put the views of the party as such before the nation in the House of Commons. There are two concepts of democracy at work in achieving the right balance here. The "social democrat" will tend to say that M.P.'s are elected by, and are thus responsible first of all to, the voters; and therefore, whatever the party activists or even the party conference may say, the M.P.'s primary loyalty is to the electorate who after all have put him where he is. On the other hand, another view tends to suggest that parliamentary elections are not the only places where democracy occurs, and that an M.P. who has been chosen to put his party's point of view should be accountable to the party for his parliamentary behavior as well as to the electorate. This concept of democracy will tend to see M.P. as a delegate rather than as a personal representative; he or she should subordinate personal views to the wishes of the organization which has after all worked hardest to put him or her at the center of power. The current debate over the best way of choosing the party leader is really only a symptom of this underlying division of views about the nature of democracy itself; for the proposals which were finally ratified at the most recent party conference emphasized the idea of accountability to the party and its organization, and went against the theory of democracy which says that M.P.s are essentially free agents operating according to their own consciences (and that the Prime Minister is simply the leader of this group of free agents).

I think it should be noted that there is a manifest contrast between the way the two major parties are treated and the way the Conservative party is treated in the media. Thus it is probably true that the Conservative party is as indebted for its finances, if not for its organization, to business as the Labor party is to the trade union movement. At any rate the ideological links between big business and the Conservative party are not so very different in scope from the links between the trade unions and the Labor party. Yet whereas trade unions get a more or less continuous barrage of hostile comment from the media, the Confederation of British Industries gets very little publicity at all, except when industrial or economic matters are under discussion. It is true that lately the C.B.I. has been at odds with the Thatcher government over matters such as interest rates and the squeeze on industrial investment; but in general big business does not get anything like as much exposure, and certainly nothing like as much hostile exposure, as the trade unions.

This imbalance in the media has tended to distort the situation in the Labor party in the public mind to a considerable extent. For example, it is certainly not the case that the trade union leaders were unanimous in wishing for a larger say in the

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choice of the party leader. On the contrary, several of the largest unions voted in just the opposite way (the engineers being the most vociferous on this). Many of the union leaders are currently working to have a *smaller* share of the vote for the leadership than they currently have as a result of the recent conference decision. The engineering union even went so far as to vote against any proposal which gave the Labor M.P.s *less* than 75 percent of the votes on this crucial issue. Ironically in doing so it quite possibly allowed the new system to go through, instead of supporting the more moderate proposals of some other trade unionists. The pressure for a change in the means of choosing the leader came largely from the more radical elements among the constituency parties, aided and abetted by a small number of Labor M.P.s led by Mr. Tony Benn and Mr. Eric Heffer.

The issues at stake in this matter are important. On the side of the "radicals" is the concept of democracy which I have already described, which insists on the importance of the accountability of members of the House of Commons, and especially the Prime Minister, to the party of which they are the elected parliamentary representatives. One can understand this argument when, as recent history tends to suggest, it becomes ever more frustrating for active party workers, who spend a large part of their lives working for a particular cause, to find that despite all their hard work, the cause has been lost because of the freedom of action of M.P.s to think and vote according to their own opinion and not according to those of the party they lead.

Against this argument, however, is another which is almost as powerful. This is that if the leader is to be chosen, not by "one man one vote" elections by all the paid-up party members, and not by the M.P.s, but by a "college" made up very largely of trade union leaders, then it could easily happen that the choice of leader would depend on the votes of those who are not members of the Labor party at all (for it has to be remembered that there is no compulsion on a union to elect as its leaders men or women who are members of the Labor party). A minority of trade union members are, for example, members of the Communist party. Others could easily be members of the Conservative party. Certainly a number are sympathetic to the new break-away Social Democratic party

led by Mr. Roy Jenkins and the so-called "gang of three," i.e., Shirley Williams, William Rodgers and David Owen. It would certainly seem odd for the leader of the Labor party to be chosen by people who are not even members of that party. However remote the possibility may be, there seems something wrong with the idea as a matter of principle.

At a lower level, there is also at present a controversy about the selection, or rather re-selection of candidate M.P.s, between elections. This is another example of the "delegate" theory of democracy creeping into the party ideology. At present, if a Member of Parliament is chosen by his constituency party to stand for parliament, and if he is elected, he will remain that constituency's choice more or less indefinitely unless he misbehaves himself or fails to get elected the next time round. However, there are moves afoot to create a process of compulsory re-selection between elections, in order to make sure the local party organization has some control over the behavior of 'its' member for the lifetime of the parliament for which he is elected. If an M.P. has the threat of not being chosen the next time round hanging over his head (the theory goes), he is more likely to toe the party line than he would be if he had no qualms on this score. It is of course precisely for this reason that the Social Democrats tend to oppose compulsory re-selection of M.P.s between elections.

Another point of argument at the present time concerns the party manifesto, i.e., the policy "ticket" on which the party stands at a general election. The question is, "Who should decide what is to go into the manifesto?" One group argues that the manifesto should be written by those who will have to put its policies into practice if the party is elected, i.e., the Members of Parliament with the party leader as the driving force behind them. However, the other view tends to be that the manifesto is an expression of the will of the party as a whole, as expressed, for example, through resolutions passed at the annual conference, and through the collective decisions of the national executive council. Since the national executive is at present dominated by the more radical members of the party, the Social Democrats naturally fear that a move in this direction would tend to "radicalize" the manifesto, perhaps to the extent of making it totally unacceptable to the electorate. In other words, they fear that a manifesto written by the party as a whole, rather than by the M.P.s, will be likely to kill any chance the party may have of reelection. So the issue involved here is both one of democratic theory and political expediency.

What are the chances of the Social Democrats actually building a successful new party between now and the general election? It is hard to answer that question with any confidence. On the whole the Social Democrats as a group support the European Economic Community and Britain's membership in it very strongly. This may make them unpopular with the electorate—though since British electors are notoriously unaffected in their voting by foreign policy matters, it may be easy to exaggerate the importance of popular hostility to the Common Market. The Social Democrats are also supporters of NATO and Britain's membership in this alliance and indeed of

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the retention of the British nuclear deterrent as part of the Western defense forces.

On home affairs, however, policies of the Social Democrats are as yet very far from clear. This is partly because it is very uncertain how far they will wish to make common cause with the Liberal party between now and the next election. Furthermore, they have as yet no clear power base in the country. Although a good many trade unionists are probably sympathetic to their point of view, it seems most unlikely that any large trade union will sever its links with the Labor party and join a new centrist group. One or two union leaders, such as Frank Chapple of the Electricians, might do so but disaffiliation from the Labor party by trade unions on a large scale seems extremely unlikely. Hence the Social Democrats have no financial or organizational basis either in the work place or indeed in constituencies. They might have some chance of gaining support at the constituency level but will it be enough for them to get anywhere at an election? This seems doubtful.

Possibly the likeliest result of any significant successes by the new center party will be to split the Labor vote and thus to throw away the chance of getting rid of a Tory government that is at present profoundly unpopular. It looks to me as though there is every chance that the Tories might lose the next election since there is no real sign as yet of the recession bottoming out in Britain. But a center party working against both the Conservatives and the Labor party, allied in some loose way with the Liberals, would constitute a real danger to a Labor victory. This is where the greatest dilemma in British politics lies; many voters are persuaded at the present time by hostile media coverage of the activities of the Labor party "radicals" led by Mr. Benn and Mr. Heffer, and they would undoubtedly vote Social Democrat in preference either to Labor or Tory. How far there is a real fellow-feeling between the Liberals and the Social Democrats is not easy to ascertain, although at times the Liberals seem (and at all times they say) that they are a party of radical change and a genuine alternative to either of the larger groups. When the chips are down, most Liberal voters would, I think, prefer a Conservative to a Labor government in power. That is to say, their hostility towards such things as nationalization and any increase of trade union power is greater than their hostility to big business and monetary theory.

One of the most important ingredients of the mix at the present time is the upsurge of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament. I suspect that a good many people who are Social Democrats at heart, for idealistic reasons, are also nuclear disarmers for similar reasons. Yet at present Social Democrats seem to have set their face against nuclear disarmament for Britain; whereas the Labor party, as at present constituted, and certainly the more radical elements in it, are firmly committed to just this cause. A good many people therefore may feel torn between support for a party which is against nuclear weapons on the one hand, and support for a group on the other which represents their notions of how socialism should be achieved by parliamentary means. The trade unions are very divided on this issue, especially at the practical level, when defense policy changes seem to threaten even more jobs than are threatened already. It is far from the case that all nuclear disarmers are Marxists or Trotskyites; indeed, as may be well known, the secretary of the campaign is a Catholic priest who (though reluctant to admit it) is a Monsignor no less.

To sum up then: the Labor party is in a good deal of a mess, and the reasons are complex and solutions intractable. But a good deal can happen between now and the next general election and it is not easy to forecast with any certainty what may happen to the party between now and the next time the voters have a chance to look at it long and hard. My own view, for what it is worth, is that the Social Democrat center will not amount to much in the end. But meanwhile it seems likely that disputes within the Labor party, and the labor movement, will continue to attract a good deal of attention and energy. For this reason the Conservative government may get an easier ride than it deserves in the next year or two. BRIAN WICKER

(Brian Wicker is Commonweal's *regular correspondent in Great Britain.)*

Of several minds: *Abigail McCarthy*

STILL REACHING

WOMEN & POLITICAL POWER

ALL MOVEMENTS ebb and flow. Just now there is a feeling that the tide of the women's movement is receding. What is really happening, it seems to me, is that even as their gains are threatened by rising unemployment and the cutback in government programs which have been helpful to them, women are consolidating these gains and taking time for a more thorough analysis of what the women's movement is, what its aims are, and how it contributes to the understanding of, and the betterment of, the human condition.

This month, for example, The Institute for Women Today—an institute sponsored by church-related Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish women's organizations to search for the religious and historical roots of women's liberation—is sponsoring the Annette Walters Memorial Conference on the philosophy of women's liberation. The planners feel that the struggle of women for equality is based on a philosophy "which has not yet been articulated" and that may be one of the reasons why "it crests and recedes in each century." They note that the greatest changes in human society were brought about by philosophical theories, and that it usually takes fifty years for a philosophy to "seep down" so that it has practical effect. "This meeting," they

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"Little girls grow up and have careers because that's what little girls do."

say, "will be a beginning."

To find a unifying philosophy for a movement which concerns a little more than half the human race will not be easy. Dr. Mary P. Burke in the admirably succinct and well-organized book which she calls a "primer" (*Reaching for Justice:* The Women's Movement, $4.95 including postage and handling, just published by the Center of Concern, 3700 13th St., N.E., Washington D.C. 20017) finds a multiplicity of aims under the umbrella of the overall endeavor to secure justice. "The movement is still unorganized and those involved are sometimes working for contradictory goals."

What are these goals? She finds at least *eight* different ones. Empowerment is one, so that women can take control of their own lives and function with some expectation of success in the public arena. (Would the desire for equality in education fit there?) The integration of women into public life and decision-making is another. Economic equality is a third. The changing of economic structures which some women see as the cause of oppression is related to that. Recognition of women's gifts, talents, and needs is still another.

Under the goal which has caused so much controversy—"control of their own bodies"—she groups women's desires for freedom from rape, from battering by spouses, from use and abuse in pornography, from unwanted pregnancies. Some women want to move the humane influence attributed to women in the private sphere into the public sphere so as to create a more human society. Other women are concerned with the improvement of relationships between men and women in the workplace, in marriage, and in the family. Still others focus "on the principle of hierarchy and the struggle to end it."

She finds a wide sweep of other issues on the women's agenda including sexist language ("words shape and limit our concepts"), the differing values of men and women, child care, health, probing the history of women. . . .

Mary P. Burke has taken the unusual step of including the women who would deny being part of the movement in her analysis:

> I have included them in this survey because the values they advocate are vital to our society and to the world at large and need to be taken into account as the women's movement develops. In addition the public activities of some, women in the group make them very much a part of the women's movement develops. In addition, example, is as much known for her stand on women's issues as is Betty Friedan.

She is even-handed in describing division in the movement: "The acrimonious and deep polarization over abortion, for which pro's and anti's are alike responsible, has created an almost imposible situation." And is quick to note that style is as important as substance in distinguishing women's groups.

A book such as Mary Burke's is in itself evidence of the arrival of the women's effort at the point of consolidation of gains. Dr. Burke is part of the project team at the Center of Concern on Women in Church and Society. (Other members of the team are Sister Maria Riley, O.P., and Jane Blewett.) Her book does not advocate—it explains and is intended, in part, to answer some of the questions raised by women ambivalent toward or puzzled by the movement. In the space of 162 pages she places the effort in the United States in its context in history and in the world-wide situation of women. For the most part she does it in clear language free of the unfortunate sociologese which blights so much popular theological and philosophical writing—the use of nouns as cumbersome verbs, for example—*theologize, impact, critique*.

There are concrete gains to be consolidated, too. If anything has slowed the progress of the women's movement—and its ability to affect the inequities which make women and women's children the poorest of the poor—it has probably been the fact that its leaders have stayed too long with the tactics of demonstration and mass lobbying. This is not to say that both tactics are not legitimate and useful. But the goal is the acquisition of political power. That means learning political skills—to elect people. Political analyst Mark Shields thinks that women are beginning to acquire the expertise and unity which will give them that power—and that a significant change in national attitude makes it easier for them. He points out the first husband in history to run to succeed his wife has just done so in a recent Maryland primary. The candidate's platform had simply been that he could best carry out the mandate *she* had been given. "Voters did not seem to think less of this first man who sought to take his wife's place. [He] won more votes than all but one of the thirty other candidates."

Shields thinks it significant that the numbers of women elected to state legislatures has increased so rapidly since 1971. There were 362 women elected that year; now there are 905—twelve percent, up from five. "There are twenty-one women in Congress, compared with eleven in 1971. But the state legislative numbers are the ones that impress the politicians. State legislatures are the farm system of congressional politics."

Most important of all, however, is the gain women are making in coming together. Previously extreme liberationists now welcome the help of family women in the struggle for equality and seek to define aims in terms of these women's needs. Religious women working side by side with lay women in institutions are coming to see that, in terms of justice, they too are lay. It may not take fifty years after all. ABIGAIL McCARTHY

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Church/world watch

Three wars in Lebanon

J. Bryan Hehir

AS THIS COLUMN is written the mission of Philip Habib, special envoy of President Reagan to the Lebanese crisis, remains unfinished. Even without knowing the consequences of the Habib efforts at mediation between Syria and Israel, two judgements can be made about the project. First, the Lebanese problem is getting the kind of high-level intensive attention it requires and has required for the last five years. Second, Habib is a superb choice for the negotiating task; an experienced diplomat who knows both the Lebanon problem and the Middle East well, Habib brings skill and stature to his emergency mission of preventing the outbreak of full-scale war in Lebanon.

By assessing the dimensions of the problem facing Habib and the other diplomatic actors concerned with the Lebanese crisis, it is possible to see the centrality of Lebanon to the larger Middle East question and the U.S. responsibility in Lebanon. There are three levels of the Lebanese problem: the internal problem, the regional conflict, and the superpower relationship to Lebanon.

The internal conflict among the Lebanese (including the relationship of the Lebanese to the 600,000 Palestinians in Lebanon) is the core of the problem. The internal problem is often described as a religious conflict of Christians and Moslems. The description, like similar descriptions applied to Northern Ireland, depicts a dimension of the Lebanese problem as the whole question. There is a religious history to the Lebanese conflict and there are religious fears among the Moslems and the Christians in Lebanon. But one cannot unfold the history nor understand the fears without passing from isues of religous identity to questions of the political constitution of Lebanon and the social and economic relationships among the relevant parties. The political and economic questions cannot be reduced to purely religious categories. The complex formula of the National Compact designed in 1943 to provide a constitutional framework for a religiously pluralistic society is today one of the points of conflict in Lebanon. It must be redrawn to provide both secure guarantees for the Christians in their historic role in Lebanon, and needed changes for the Moslem role in the political life of Lebanon. In this issue as in others, religious commitments run through questions, but they don't exhaust their meaning.

The delicate internal reconstruction of Lebanese society would be a monumental task under any conditions, but an equally relevant dimension of the present challenge is the regional conflict which is now woven through the Lebanese reality. The local and regional relationships are multiple. First, the Palestinian presence in Lebanon is a symbol of the unresolved issue of the Palestinians in the Middle East; the Palestinians are not simply refugees in Lebanon, for it has become the nerve center of the Palestinian movement, and they, in turn, have become an active political force in Lebanese society. Second, Israeli participation in the Lebanese conflict is pervasive and extensive: it includes ties to some of the Christian forces in Lebanon, strikes (retaliatory or preemptive) at Palestinian bases in Southern Lebanon and now the danger of direct conflict with Syria. Third, the Syrian presence, initiated under the rubric of the Arab Deterrent Force in the mid-seventies, has become a source of hostility and suspicion among Lebanese of various political persuasions. The regional conflict at the present time is exceedingly dangerous; the Israeli-Syrian confrontation could overwhelm the myriad internal questions and lead to the dismemberment of the nation.

The superpowers relate to the Lebanese conflict in and through their regional allies. The Soviets are the principal supporters of Syria and the Soviet-Syrian relationship has intensified as Syria has become more isolated in the Arab world. The U.S.-Israel relationship is one link we have to the Lebanese problem, but we also have historic ties to Lebanese political life which gives the U.S. added influence in the diplomatic activity surrounding Lebanon.

A diplomatic resolution of the Lebanese crisis requires simultaneous involvement at all three levels. The superpowers' first contribution is a mix of restraint and a recognition of the potential seriousness of a full-scale war in Lebanon; their second contribution is their ability to contain the activity of Syria and Israel. This superpower-ally relationship should not be conceived as a simple test of superpower will: Syria and Israel do not automatically respond to big-power commands. Each has an irreducible margin of freedom where superpower coercion is negligible. The regional conflict has roots outside Lebanon; the great danger is that Syria and Israel will use Lebanon as the theater for resolving issues which are not Lebanese.

A case can be made that the Lebanese could resolve the multi-dimensional conflict afflicting their nation, if they could be insulated from outside forces. This Lebanese option, however, requires a major diplomatic initiative. Minimally, the initiative must prevent war between Syria and Israel, while moving to strengthen the central government in Lebanon. Maximally, the initiative could be designed to substitute another peacekeeping force for the Syrians, and obtain a firm Israeli abstention from preemptive raids into Southern Lebanon.

(Continued on page 351)

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A feminist's journey

JEAN BETHKE ELSHTAIN

The following is a talk delivered at the Putney School, Putney, Vermont. THE EDITORS

I HAVE BEEN asked to discuss what the women's movement has been and is and to tie that in with some autobiographical fragments that might help you to make sense of how the women's movement has affected, in my own case, the life of a woman born just as this country was entering the Second World War, a woman about to turn forty just as it seems we are being primed, by the Reaganites and the military-industrial complex, for another.

That my life is framed by one war and what seems to be the military and psychological build-up for another, despite Vietnam and the trauma of the '60s, is important for it indicates that the contemporary women's movement, just like its nineteenth century predecessor, has thus far, despite the efforts of many noble women, been unable to significantly influence public policy and the direction of political events away from war. Indeed, at this point we are even told by some women that, in the name of feminism, they should be *free* to enter combat duty just like any man because, as one senior woman in the Pentagon, who calls herself a feminist, put it, "Women need a chance to prove themselves. You can't become a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff unless you've earned your stripes in battle."

Is this what we've come to? Well, it is part of what we've come to and it makes it all the more imperative to think through what feminism is, what it stands for—or ought to stand for—if the new woman is not to be just a clone of the old man. Does, or ought, feminism to represent some alternative to politics as usual, and war, and restless, rootless ambition and striving after material success, all the costly and damaging dimensions of a particular sort of upwardly mobile American male ethos?

The truth is: the women's movement has never known, from its inception, whether to join 'em or oppose 'em. Roughly, whether one wished, within the frame of one feminist perspective, to enter the extant hierarchy of status, power, and privilege, or whether, from a different feminist perspective, one questioned hierarchical arrangements and promoted an alternative vision of society, turned, first, on one's notions of the political community and second, on one's theories of how men and women got to be the sorts of beings they are, and were.

Some feminists held to a strict environmentalist thesis: we get to be the way we are because the environment shapes and molds us into certain forms, including particular ways of looking at the world depending upon whether we are males or females. This means, by implication, that as women forsake the world of family and domesticity, with its ideal imperatives of compassion, nurturance, protection of the weak and the vulnerable and long-range affective ties and responsibilities for the harder-edged, more driven world of business and politics, they, too, can and will acquire the characteristics necessary for success in that world. For many feminists this is unacceptable. They not only want to retain the virtues and moral imperatives tied to mothering, to kin ties, to emotional and intimate familial values, they want the public world to be infused with these qualities and virtues as well.

This bind—this dilemma—has never been resolved. It haunts the feminist movement and the women who identify with it. It helps to explain the ambivalence many women feel about success on the world's terms. It is simplistic to label women's reluctance to be whole-heartedly ambitious strivers their "fear of success." That is a vacuous assumption based on a distorted psychology. Instead something much more complicated is going on. Women sense, deep in their bones, that the smaller world, the world of children and neighbors and simple, necessary tasks has its own virtues and blessings, as well as real pain in being immersed and tied to the realm within which maternal thinking and action occur. To forsake that world entirely, to lose its life-forgiving values when it is at its best, is to lose a great deal and to further deprive the world of principles that counter the machine of megadeaths we construct with such energy with each passing month and year.

I can speak of this ambivalence because I feel and have felt

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it. Deep down. It isn't a superficial conflict I can readily eliminate. It isn't a conflict of competing statuses, or roles, or all the other thin notions sociologists use a lot. It isn't "cognitive dissonance" as some psychologist might claim. It is the competing imperatives of two different ways of being a human being, of making one's way in the world, or striving to be somebody, to have a clear self- and social identity, to have, in a world increasingly stripped of it, honor.

MY OWN JOURNEY as a feminist began even before I knew the term, before there was such a thing as a women's movement. I grew up, in the rural Colorado West, where people were still judged, in those days at any rate, more by the quality of their character and by their capacities for hard work, duty, and perseverance than by their sex. As far back as I can remember I saw women running the whole show in the house, baking, making homemade catsup and sausage, sewing dresses for my sisters, my cousins, and me out of one-hundred-pound flour sacks. I saw women taking care of the chickens, working in the fields, shoveling silage, driving tractors, milking cows, and, in my grandmother's case, building fences and cupboards and even houses. Farm life was roughly egalitarian—on the family farm there was no clear-cut division of labor. Everyone worked. Everyone contributed. Nobody was idle, or was allowed to remain idle for long.

It came as some surprise to me, when I left this environment, that was both sheltered yet a source of enormous strength of character, to learn that women were supposed to spend their time ironing doilies, playing bridge, or going off to the local beauty salon in order to keep themselves attractive for their husbands. Of course I had no desire to be (this is harsh but then the Lutheran pietism I grew up in is no easy religion) a parasite, a plaything, a decorative do-nothing. We were put on this earth to make a difference, to make a contribution, to leave the world a better place than what we had found it.

How, then, to make that contribution in a rapidly changing epoch that would forever break up and dissolve that rural way of life of my grandmother and my mother and myself as a little girl? I was too restless, I cast my net too wide, to be content to make my contribution within a small compass. I had romantic dreams of adventure—of being a female war correspondent (there's one dimension of the feminist image, for it required a war to be realized) or a compassionate, nurturant leader, a mother to her people (there's another). Along the way I just assumed—I didn't think about choices here—that I would get married and have children. I did—I had three children and a master's degree by the time I was twenty-four. I figured you could do everything.

When I began my prolific adventures there *were* those who said it "couldn't be done," but there was no feminist movement around to tell me the same thing—that it was impossible to be married, have babies, and go to school. I assumed you could do it and I did, although my family pretty much thought I was overdoing it and they tried to get me to slow down. This experience and my study of history have taught me that those within the contemporary feminist movement who specialize in wallowing in self-pity and portraying women as nothing but helpless victims, do women an enormous disservice.

To the extent that you see yourself as nothing but a victim, you will internalize that victimization, come to define yourself under its terms and act just like a victim—you will become the living evidence of your own pathetic view of yourself. It is one thing to point out instances of outrageous brutalization and victimization of women. It is quite something else again to label women nothing but victims. It is false. It is wrong. It is demeaning. It denies women self-respect.

My fourth child was born just nine months after I started work on my Ph.D. in political theory at Brandeis University. That was back in 1966. Now certain academic, or intellectual, problems began. Life had long been hectic, even frenzied. But now it became troubled. I had gone through a lot, personally and politically. But I was now, as a graduate student in a political science department, brought up against those binds (join 'em or fight 'em) I talked about earlier. I was a woman in an epoch when there was, once again, an official feminist movement, a married woman with children at that, hence a "deviant" within the hallowed halls of academe. Let me explain the nature and meaning of this conflict.

GRADUATE SCHOOL isn't about learning things—facts and theories and one's specific discipline. It also involves learning *how to think in particular ways*—or at least graduate schools attempt to force their students within a certain mainstream mold. To buck the tide is difficult. It helps, of course, to have a sympathetic professor or two who may be outside the mainstream themselves. I found one who would tolerate what were seen as my eccentricities—in my own case a concern with how political theorists from the Great Tradition, Plato to the present, understood the relationship between women and politics and the categories they used to explore that issue. That became for me a focus on the public and the private—on the distinctions made between public or political notions, activities, relations, purposes and those that were deemed private, for a variety of reasons.

Much hinges on this debate, of course, including a particular theorist's views on whether women were or were not, could or could not be political beings. What also turns on this issue is one's ideal of politics: is it, finally, to do with *Who gets what when where how?* With power, force, violence, and compulsion? Or does politics have something to do with certain ideals of the common good and of public ends and purposes, of the capacity of human beings to transcend narrow self-interest and think and work for the good of others? That was my passion, my concern, and it was, of course, directly related to my life, to my own conflicts over public and private.

But I learned something interesting in graduate school, or at least my teachers attempted to teach me this, and that was that neither my life nor anybody else's had much of anything to do with political science as a particular, abstract, academically organized and structured inquiry. I recall vividly a paper I wrote for a Political Sociology course. It was a paper about the '60s, the decade we were then in. We were supposed to do

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something on the student rebellion, civil rights, and so on, and I did. I wrote about the impact of the life and death of John F. Kennedy on my generation—the way he energized us in political ways. I wrote about the vital coming together of politics and culture, the way the music of the '60s, especially Bob Dylan and the Beatles, was not so much 'in the background' as itself constitutive of the activities we were engaged in. The music was *in* the politics; politics was *in* the music. I wrote about hippies and the repudiation of war and violence, particularly as a definition of masculine identity. And my professor said to me, "Well, this is another interesting Jean Elshtain paper. But of course it has nothing to do with the scientific study of politics."

I thought: well to hell with the study of politics then. If politics doesn't have to do with people's lives, what does it have to do with? But in reality I was devastated. I thought: I can't do this. I've got the wrong kind of mind. I don't think the way I'm supposed to think. Somehow I survived and managed to keep on keeping on and at least part of what prevented me from becoming a political science clone was the messy reality of my private life. Of husband and kids and friends and pets and Beatle music and Bob Dylan and the competing loyalties and standards and commitments and the features of human reality they involve.

I have long hated all those book dedications academics write to their wives and children for being quiet and out of sight and patient while they hid away in splendid isolation doing their dry tomes. Well, in the dedication to my book which the Princeton University Press will bring out later this year I thank my children for being always within earshot and eyeshot because that helped me to stay in touch with what counts: with real, concrete, particular human beings. Don't let anyone tell you feminism or a feminist commitment requires certain rigid either/or choices. Either marriage or career/ Either children or none. Don't let anyone make you half a human being by fiat, for if you let others make those choices for you, that is precisely what you will become.

What I am trying to convey to you is that, finally, every one of us has the choice to make our own destinies. This doesn't make us individualists, or at least it need not; rather it makes us responsible, choosing, willing human beings rather than patsies, pawns, and blobs. Each of us must struggle to attain and maintain an identity. You cannot allow feminism to create some ready-made identity for you, or you should not, any more than women who rebelled against it allowed the old femininity to create their identities out of whole cloth for them. It is always difficult for social rebels, people who have in some way swum against the tide (and I include myself here as a woman in a profession with few women who is also part of a minority of that profession, a political theorist, and, further, a minority of that minority, a critical theorist) to accept the fact that others may not wish to follow them in the terms they set up for their own rebellion. It's as if we wish to say, "You don't have to go through all that. I did it for you. I fought that battle, you don't have to."

Nobody can do it for you. And if they claim they can—that they only wish to spare you—please be patient and understanding that, most of the time, they mean well. Then go on to live your own life, understanding that it isn't just the visions of life promoted by the "status quo" you need to question but those promoted by the social rebels and revolutionaries as well. In whose behalf is their dream being dreamt? If feminism means anything, it means we can and must dream our own dreams and that these dreams, in the final analysis, must unite us, in peace and fellowship, with other human beings rather than divide us, one from another.

ANOTHER LOOK AT WELFARE FRAUD

'I'm not your typical welfare case . . .'

ROBERT JOE STOUT

"I'M NOT your typical welfare case. . . ." The slightly-built 23-year-old woman twisted a loose strand of her long red hair around her forefinger, then abruptly pushed it back over her ear. "I've had a year of college and I really want to work. It's just that I got behind and. . . ."

Again her fingers tugged at her hair, then brushed imaginary specks from the man's plaid shirt that she was wearing. "I just . . ." she started, then slumped forward and dropped her hands into her lap. "Okay, so what happens now?" she sighed.

Bound over to probation after the San Francisco public defender who had been appointed to represent her in court wrangled a reduction of the charges against her from felony to misdemeanor welfare fraud, Sondra Angel says she is "too burned-out to care what they do to me now." Her two children, ages two and three, had been placed temporarily in a state-funded receiving home. Their father, a Spanish-born Mexican exchange student whom Sondra had lived with for

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nearly four years but had never married, was back in Mexico. "His family," she shrugged, "won't let him come back and marry me. And he quit sending me money. I think he's forgotten about me."

Evicted from their Potrero Hills flat after he left, Sondra bundled her kids into a 17-year-old Volkswagen and headed down the coast to the little town near San Luis Obispo where her parents lived. The car broke down and she spent the night in an all-night gas station waiting for her father to drive north to pick her up. Within two weeks she had a job in a fast-food outlet but neither her mother (who also worked) nor a married sister could take care of the babies and no private child-care facilities were available for children that young.

When the three-year-old, Joaquin, developed alimentary tract problems, Sondra applied for AFDC (Aid for Dependent Children) in order to become eligible for Medicare. She moved out of her parents' house and adopted her children's father's name to spare Mom and Dad embarrassment; it's a small town and "people talk." Continuing friction with her family prompted her to return to the city. Through an employment agency she got a temporary, but full-time, job with a Reno-Las Vegas outfit set up by the casinos to collect gambling debts from Bay Area residents.

"I had to put an extra three-hundred dollars advance on the dinky little apartment I rented. Sure, I was working, but I had less than eight bucks in my purse when my welfare check was forwarded from San Luis Obispo County. It was from the month before and I thought it was all right for me to cash it."

SONDRA NEVER reported her collection agency earnings after her temporary job folded. Nor did she report income from a bartending gig in a Powell Street saloon. "I was behind on the rent, I didn't have any clothes to go job-hunting in. When I worked I had to pay somebody to take care of the kids. . . ." Another AFDC mother's advice that "I forget trying to work and live on welfare until the kids were in school" was repeated by a San Francisco social worker. Even an employment agency counselor told her the same thing.

But the Reno-Las Vegas debt collectors called and "I went back to work. Listen, I was really pushed for money. I needed the extra cash. I was paying two-seventy a month rent and forty a week for food, plus ten bucks a day for child care every day I worked or looked for a job." By this time, the welfare office in San Luis Obispo County had learned that Sondra was in San Francisco. They took her off their rolls and instructed her to reapply in San Francisco.

"I did. But it took six weeks to get any money. By then I was desperate. I'd've gone out and sold my body if I knew how — or thought I could get anything for it. I was offered a permanent job but I didn't have any cash to pay a babysitter. So I sat home with the kids. For a week all we ate was day-old bread and over-ripe bananas. I even pulled leftover lettuce and cabbage out of a grocery store garbage can."

Three months later the unreported income caught up with her. A welfare fraud investigor cornered her and she admitted her guilt. A Superior Court judge sentenced her to 10 days in jail, a fine of $500 and ordered her to pay restitution for the money that she illegally had received from welfare. That first-offense sentence was stiffer than those meted out that same day by the same judge to an armed robber, a man who committed assault with a deadly weapon, a drunk driver who smashed into and nearly killed a 10-year-old bicyclist, a fifth-offender panderer and several prostitutes.

Despite her assertion to the contrary, Sondra Angel's case "was a re-run of what I hear twenty times a week," according to her probation officer. Few welfare recipients drive Cadillacs. The California Welfare Rights Organization estimates that over ninety percent of the people prosecuted for welfare fraud are AFDC recipients who pocketed less than $1,000 in illegal aid "usually for unreported income, duplicate payments from two different counties or violation of non-resident father requirements."

The average AFDC recipient stays on welfare only five to eight months. Most of them, like Sondra Angel, slip in and out of the work force. (A New Jersey study quoted by Philip A. AuClaire noted that AFDC families in that state depended upon welfare for only forty-two percent of their actual income, the rest coming from temporary or part-time earnings or child-care payments from absent spouses, which, in many cases, was insufficient to keep the recipients above minimum subsistence levels.) Ironically, they are the ones being lopped off the rolls by the Reagan administration's "truly needy" definition.

Edwin L. Dale Jr., of Reagan's Office of Management and Budget, admits that the proposed welfare changes would penalize low-paid workers who qualify for some welfare bene-

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fits. The Chicago Center for the Study of Welfare Reform reports that a working mother with two children who earns $4 an hour in New York City would be better off financially not working at all. She would collect $518 a month from welfare, while her net disposable income as a wage-earner comes to only $542.

"HEY! FORGET trying to work!" a Syracuse, New York, woman advises single-parent family heads. Child care difficulties caused her to leave five jobs in less than 11 months. A high school drop-out, she never has earned more than 20¢-an-hour over the minimum wage. "Jobs like I can get, they don't just let you call in when your kids are sick." She contrasted her situation with that of a city-employed social worker. "My baby, he got left in a backyard by a baby sitter. He was crying and throwing up and a neighbor came to get me where I was working at a restaurant. My boss, he said I could leave but 'you be back here at six in the morning!' I spent all day trying to get another baby sitter. Finally I did but she calls the next morning and says she's changed her mind and won't take my kids.

"I didn't know what to do. So I locked the kids in the house and told the four-year-old he should take care of the baby. But she got to crying and the neighbors turned me in for child abuse. So I quit my job to take care of them, and the welfare people, they got on my case and acted like I was a leech on the government. 'Hell!' I told them, 'I want to work. But I got to get somebody to take care of my kids first.' "

A Corpus Christi, Texas, mother arrested for welfare fraud admitted that she had been living with her estranged husband while collecting AFDC payments of $214 a month. "It wasn't that I wanted Joe around but he'd been laid off or fired by Reynolds and was drinking again." She had re-enrolled in school on the basis of receiving child support payments from him and "I didn't want to blow the whole thing by quitting in mid-semester." So she applied for welfare. Her husband took care of the children in the day-time but contributed nothing financially to their support. Like Sondra Angel, she pleaded guilty to misdemeanor charges and was fined and placed on probation. "What was I supposed to do," she asked the judge who sentenced her, "kick him out and let him sleep on the streets? I knew if I did I'd never get child support money from him ever again."

Sociologists Marie Withers Osmond and Charles M. Grigg insist that being on welfare "is not an alternative to being employed. [Many recipients] both work and receive public assistance and still are not financially advanced over sub-poverty level incomes." The implementation of a "Work-fare" system in California in the late '60s under then-Governor Ronald Reagan precipitated an increase in the number of applicants in many of the participating countries when poverty-level wage-earners applied for benefits in hopes of acquiring better jobs.

No one ranks lower than a welfare recipient in the public's eye. A Los Angeles police officer told a newspaper reporter, "I'd rather take a murderer to dinner." In Baltimore, a convicted prostitute told a judge, "At least I'm not on welfare, I'm proud to say." Harold R. Kerbo notes, "To many beneficiaries and potential beneficiaries one of the costs of participating in a welfare program is a loss of pride." His studies, and those by Goodwin and by Chrissinger, confirm that most welfare recipients share the same work-ethic values expressed by middle-class wage-earners.

But in respect to those values, they view themselves as "failures." Their low self-esteem is often reflected by their actions and their appearance. Those who stay on welfare for a period of years become increasingly dependent, both financially and psychologically. These attitudes sometimes lead to self- or child-abuse or neglect and create victims for swindlers, adventurers, and pushers.

MANY RECIPIENTS go to great lengths to conceal their welfare status. A divorcée from a middle-class Chicago neighborhood admitted that she had kept her three children indoors eight hours a day for over two years because "I didn't want anyone to know I was on welfare." Twice a week, in the evening or on weekends, she drove nearly 11 miles to a grocery store in another part of town so that no one in her neighborhood would learn that she received food stamps. A public defender used letters written by friends of an AFDC recipient in Santa Clara County, California, to show the court how his client, arrested for possessing stolen property, had faithfully supported his wife and children by sending them money each month. Later it was determined that his ex-wife had invented those payments in order to conceal the fact that she was receiving welfare.

For these women, the problem is not welfare, but poverty. A 19-year-old black AFDC recipient told me, "A single person, okay, she can get by, live in an apartment with a roommate, that's fine. She don't need so much money. But when you got kids, you got to take care of kids. You can't live in the same little apartment. You get a job, you got to pay somebody for child care. Chances are, whoever you get won't take care of them as good as you would yourself. So why punish the kids? At least, with my staying home with them, they're not out on the streets. They're not learning things I don't want them to learn."

For years, law makers and bureaucrats have attempted to redefine poverty with terms like "disadvantaged" and "safety nets." These, and cosmetic offerings such as "Work-fare" or "negative tax credits" are more for treating middle-class consciences than the disease whose symptoms are poverty, apathy, and despair. As inflation increases, and mergers and mechanization cause entry-level job opportunities to decline, as housing becomes scarcer and decaying social patterns create more and more single-parent families, millions of Americans find themselves clinging to the edge of the "good life." For many it already has slipped away. How we deal with their problems may in the long run tell us more about our survival as a nation than all the oil tankers ploughing the Atlantic or the amounts of military hardware that we ship out to prop up the governments of supposed allies.

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Screen

OUT OF ORDER

FIFTY MILLION FRENCHMEN ARE WRONG

ANY TIME I begin thinking that movies are an international language, like music, all I have to do to disabuse myself of the idea is remember the high esteem in which the French hold Jerry Lewis. As Andrew Sarris once pointed out, they are greatly aided in this preference by the fact that they do not speak English. They are also aided by the fact that at a comedy, a French intellectual does not actually want to be amused. He wants only to be bemused. The French see Lewis as someone who carries on in the tradition of the great screen comics of the past. He does more than that, they feel. He combines the stoical loneliness of Chaplin or Keaton with the antic zaniness of the Marx Brothers and the Three Stooges. In his films of the fifties and sixties, the silent comedy of the twenties is *synthesized* with the best sound comedy of the thirties; and there's nothing the French find more entertaining than a good historical dialectic. They see in Lewis someone who puts the gaff to modern America the same way that Jacques Tati puts it to France. (Of course, the physical comedy of Tati's films is far less flamboyant and violent; but that's because, as all Frenchmen know, even the most severe Marxists, France is a far more civilized and advanced country. It doesn't require a slapstick drubbing of the same magnitude.) Having seen Lewis thus, in his proper socio-historical-cultural setting, the French realized long ago that he's unbearably funny. The only problem I have with their assessment is that when I actually go into a theater and watch his movies — including the new one, *Hardly Working* — I don't laugh.

In the opening scene of *Hardly Working*, Lewis appears as a clown in a circus. It's an appropriate overture, for the comedy of the rest of the film is, as in Lewis's past films, very much that of the clown act. The film is a series of crash-bang vignettes, set-pieces, of the sort that clowns perform in between the other acts at a circus. One reason *Hardly Working* fails to be funny is that after over thirty years of making films, Lewis still doesn't realize that a film *isn't* a circus. In the circus the clowns come on and cut up, then they disappear from view until it's time for them to come on again. In a movie, the characters cannot disappear. The camera follows them around relentlessly, poking into their private lives as well as their public performances. Keaton and the Marx Brothers were funny in movies because they invented characters who could be on every minute, characters who were always the same, always funny, no matter what was happening. If, instead of this, a character is on for five minutes and then turns into somebody else, a private, different person, until it's time for the next slapstick routine, the result is not a comedy at all. It's an incoherent and dopey version of *Pagliacci*. That is what Lewis has made in *Hardly Working*.

Just after Lewis finishes his clown act, the circus goes out of business, a development which we in the movie audience should take as an omen. Lewis has to move in with relatives and get a job as a mailman. His life-long career as a clown lies in pieces. As if that weren't enough to make us sympathetic, his brother-in-law turns out to be a boorish ogre who ridicules him for having been a clown. He has to seek solace in the friendship of his niece (all great clowns have instant relationships with children).

I don't know, though. Lewis's attention span must be rather short, even in his own movies. Having established himself, however ineptly, as a clown down on his luck, he then builds the rest of his film around the belief that it is a far, far greater thing to be a mailman. Only a few reels after the clown bit, there is an episode where a fellow mailman teases him for being a "clown" at work. He becomes quite incensed and lectures the fellow on how his high performance with the mails proves he's not a clown any more. It's as if he's repaid a debt to society. With these long stretches where we have to take Lewis seriously as a pathetic failure who's trying to reform, it's hard to see the humor when he turns on the slapstick for a few minutes. In effect the slapstick just becomes further evidence of what a screw-up this guy is.

IN A RECENT television interview I saw, Lewis bemoaned with mock seriousness the difficulty of being fifty-five years old and still having to be, as he put it, "the keeper of the idiot." It's an interesting phrase, and no longer, I suspect, a very accurate one. It suggests that inside the day-to-day Jerry Lewis — the one, for instance, who has just come out of near bankruptcy and an addiction to pills — there is a ravening madcap, an impulsive, unpredictable fool who might break out of Lewis's personality at any moment and cause us all to die laughing. When Lewis was younger, the "idiot" was no doubt real, and a problem. Lewis has to have been the kind of kid who was treated as an idiot by all the other kids, until he discovered that if only he pulled out all the stops and got the others laughing, his innate goofiness became a social asset instead of a liability.

Even on television and in the early movies, what succeeded was not so much talent as exuberance. The sheer energy and abandon with which Lewis could throw himself into acting crazy — I remember a finale to a television special when he got so carried away with himself, he literally kicked the bandstand to pieces — was what made him irresistible, sometimes. But I suspect that at fifty-five, when the keeper throws open the idiot's cage and stands back, nothing happens. Getting the idiot to come out at all must take a lot of coaxing these days. Maybe that's what all the pills were for in the ten years since Lewis's last film — to try to get the idiot on his feet again for one more performance.

Hardly Working is enough to make me wonder if this isn't the case, anyway. In some of the more rough and tumble scenes, I even found myself looking closely to see whether

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Lewis hadn't used a double. But I guess not. Those moments when he goes flying across a room and crashing into a wall are supposed to be the whole point of this movie. It was to star in them that he made this film. What would be the sense of any of this if Lewis had to use a double to do such scenes?

COLIN L. WESTERBECK, JR.

Dance

THE SUNSHINE SIDE

PAUL TAYLOR'S CHOREOGRAPHY

CHOREOGRAPHER Paul Taylor lives in a creative world of light and shade and one never knows from which side of his prodigious talent his next work will emerge. This season his new "Arden Court" reflects the sunshine side of his temperament. All choreographers create dances designed for the talents of their companies, and the presence of six exceptionally strong male dancers, Elie Chaib, Thomas Evert, Daniel Ezralow, Christopher Gillis, David Parsons, and Kenneth Tosti has obviously had much to do with the formation of this tour de force.

It is a dance that celebrates sheer physical prowess with a suggestion of courtliness one associates with the behavior of knights errant. It has passion and playfulness and a relentless momentum until the final diagonal crossing formation of the six men. Between the opening male formation, full of leaps and turns, there are a series of duets, each of which emphasizes the violent energy of the men and the demure prettiness of the women.

The three women, Carolyn Adams, Susan McGuire, and Lila York, are more the occasions for male display than they are thoroughly realized characters. Their presence as Muse-like figures spur the men on to feats of derring-do or mannered politeness more than they engage them as persons. The men's behavior is never less than correct toward these objects of inspiration but their interest never spills over into individual commitment toward them. The chivalrous code of tourney and joust underlies all that they do and it is this concern that drives them, more than personal involvement.

The piece is in the line of choreographic development that includes "Aureole" and "Airs" as its two most distinguished predecessors. Both of the latter works were included during the three-week season at City Center 55th Street Theater, and both received sterling performances. Like "Arden Court" set to the music of William Boyce, "Aureole" and "Airs" draw on an eighteenth century composer, G.F. Handel. While Taylor has shown himself delightfully eclectic in his choice of scores, selecting contemporary electronic collages as well as repertory standards, the cadences of the eighteenth century have regularly suggested nobility and balance to him.

All three works are without overt plot and are cast in suite



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form. One of Taylor's great talents lies in his ability to take discrete bits of music and arrange related dance sequences to them that contain enough of a "story" thread to make them comprehensible, without reference to an explicit plot line. It is this unstressed connection that make his dances flow so lyrically. In other hands the same music would shatter into fragments of isolated incidents without the sense of cohesion that Taylor always imparts.

A great deal of critical fuss has been made over the new "Arden Court" as being one of the watershed dance works of the past thirty years, if not the whole century to date. It is a fine piece but one has the nagging feeling that such praise is like the award of a current prize to make up for a past oversight. It is not that Taylor has not been praised for his previous work but the presence of the superior "Aureole" and "Airs" in the season should have tended to dampen overpraise somewhat.

Since Taylor himself retired from active performing six years ago, he has been on a creative curve that has maintained a tremendous upward surge. Season after season he has presented new work that indicates an intense artistic involvement that is quite unusual among modern dance choreographers. It is far and away more typical for the artistic director of a modern company to hang onto the stage too long and choreograph works suitable for his or her diminished skills or just go through the motions of dry, sterile exercises for his company.

Taylor, on the other hand, has freed something within himself by retirement as a dancer. In most cases the retirement of the modern dance choreographer results in a loss of artistic interest. The implication is that if the creative individual cannot also present the final work to the public on stage, personally, then the creative spur has been removed. As a delightful exception to this and most other rules that govern modern dance, Taylor has proved that he continues to go his own way.

The earliest repertory piece presented was from the first decade in which Taylor began choreographing. "Three Epitaphs" was given its premiere performance in 1956 and has remained one of the choreographer's signature pieces. Its five dancers look like animate slag in Robert Rauschenberg's matt black and mirror-dotted form-fitting costumes. They slouch, they shamble and shuffle between bursts of dithery, frenzied arm twirls. They totter along to the rhythms of molasses-like jazz that seems to be extruded sluggishly from the instruments rather than bursting forth from them. One small figure shambles along after a larger male form throughout so doggedly that she bumps unexpectedly into him from behind when he halts suddenly. Their behavior is both hilarious and pathetic. Glints of light reflect from the dark costumes the way that movement spurts forth periodically from the dancers only to subside again into the resigned shuffling that is the work's most characteristic movement. It is brief but poignantly moving as a portrait of people hopefully pressing on, against the dull weight of their condition.

Last year's novelty "Le Sacre Du Printemps (The Rehearsal)" remains an intriguing enigma. There are two events taking place in two different worlds which from time to time intermingle. Dancers rehearse under the sharp eye of a ballet-mistress dressed like a cossack, while concurrently a detective attempts to find a kidnapped child and a jewel thief conspires to commit another crime. The detective finds himself placed in jail, escapes to find the child, and it, along with all of the underworld and police characters, are dispatched in a hilarious chain reaction of violence. The dancers continue to rehearse, although from time to time they have assumed the roles of police or gangsters in the other story.

The score is the two-piano arrangement of Stravinsky's score, and the movement is stylized to look like the flat, profile figures presented in frieze painting., Presumably this is a homage to the movement style featured in the original Nijinsky ballet to the same music. Technically it is restricting but Taylor has produced a variety of beautiful solos and duets that are some of the most inventive that he has ever presented. The exact intent of the work remains, for me, somewhat obscure though enjoyable. Obscure Taylor, however, is worth a dozen, clear, and less talented others.

DON McDONAGH

Books: THE ROOTS OF CONDEMNATION

CHRISTIANITY, SOCIAL TOLERANCE, AND HOMOSEXUALITY

John Boswell

University of Chicago Press, $27.50, 424 pp.

Louis Crompton

THE EARLIEST execution for homosexuality in Western Christian Europe presently known to us was of a Swiss Count who was burned in Basel in 1277. During the next five hundred years burnings, hangings, beheadings, and judicial drownings and castrations took place in France, Flanders, Spain, Italy, Switzerland, Germany, and in the Americas. At the time of the Revolution the death penalty was in force in all thirteen colonies. Hangings in these jurisdictions occurred as early as 1625 (at Jamestown) and as late as 1780 (at Hanna's Town, Pennsylvania). The infliction of capital punishment probably reached its peak in the sixteenth century, and had all but died out by the eighteenth. There were, however, some surprisingly late persecutions. A wave of religious hysteria which swept Holland in 1730 led to the death of sixty men and boys — this in a traditionally tolerant country which had much earlier given up burning heretics and witches. Though the new American states soon began to drop the death penalty and France decriminalized sodomy entirely in 1791, executions in England

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increased in number in the early nineteenth century. Published civilian statistics and unpublished naval records indicate that over a hundred hangings occurred between 1800 and 1835.

It has generally been assumed that capital laws were not enforced against women. Sherwin Bailey, in his standard study of early laws, dating from 1955, took this view. But we now know of executions for lesbianism in most of the European countries mentioned above, England being the notable exception. The current issue of the *Journal of Homosexuality*, devoted to history, reprints the record of a remarkable trial at Halberstadt in 1721 which led to the beheading of a woman who had "married" another woman and lived with her as man and wife. All in all, after eight years of looking, I have been able to document over four hundred executions of men and women, a figure which must surely represent only a small fraction of the real total.

This lethal policy appears to derive mainly from biblical precept and Christian moral theology. Justinian's famous edict of 538 blaming earthquakes, plagues, and famines on homosexuals invoked the Sodom story in its preamble. Jurists in the middle ages and the Renaissance regularly cite Leviticus 20:13 and Romans 1: 26-27 to justify capital punishment for male homosexuals and lesbians. A mortal legend, originating perhaps with St. Jerome, held that all those who violated the order of nature in this way had been struck dead at the moment of the Nativity. (This theory puzzled commentators, since Vergil was supposed to have survived.) Massachusetts's first law code transcribed Leviticus ("If a man lyeth with a man . . .") verbatim and a unique law condemning lesbians to death, passed in New Haven in 1655, incorporated Romans 1:26 in its text. It has long been known that the Inquisition in Spain sought out, sentenced, and burned homosexuals. Michael Goodich, in a recent study (*The Unmentionable Vice: Homosexuality in the Later Medieval Period*) has now shown that the Papal Inquisition, from its start in 1233, was also given the charge of hunting down sodomites as well as heretics. From St. John Chrysostom in the fourth century to Jeremy Collier in the eighteenth, there were divines who called for the enforcement of the law in its full rigor.

John Boswell's ambitious and scholarly new study tries to establish two main theses. The first is that the Bible does not take so negative a stand on homosexuality as is popularly supposed. Opinions will differ here, but it seems to me Boswell has only a very limited success in this attempt. He points out, reasonably enough, that the Sodom story tells of two angels threatened with rape and that, on this account, it is hardly appropriate to take it as a blanket condemnation of consensual acts: it does not appear to have been read that way in Old Testament times or in the Talmud. (In making sodomy preeminently the sin of Sodom, the Fathers of the Church were, one might argue, more homophobic than the earlier Jews.) Boswell dismisses the Levitical proscription as merely reflecting Jewish ritual concerns, like their food laws. But surely the point is that the early church *chose* to keep this prohibition while dismissing others as inessential to Christians. Boswell strains heroically to interpret the *arsenokoitai* of I Corinthians 6:9 as other than homosexuals, but despite all his scholarly exegesis, his argument left this reader unconvinced. And of course, there still remains the unambiguous reference of Romans 1, which was the real prop of legal and moral condemnation. Boswell argues that there is no reason for rendering the *kedeshim* of Kings 14:24 as "sodomites" (as the King James translators do). But in ignoring the important Talmudic gloss on the word he loses the best key we have to an understanding of Jewish prejudice. Surely it is significant that the only word the Old Testament has for homosexuals means literally "holy men": in this association of homosexuality with the despised aboriginal Canaanite cults lies the most likely origin of the Levitical law.

Concerned to get Christianity off the hook, Boswell is perplexed to explain the increasing intolerance of homosexuality after the fall of Rome.

Boswell's second contention is that Christian society, taken as a whole, was not strongly condemnatory of homosexuality until the age of Aquinas, who emerges as rather the intellectual villain of this study. But though the presently known record of executions date from after 1200, it is hard to believe that stringently hostile attitudes did not develop till then. The fact is that we have few trial records of any sort from before that date. The thirteenth century was a great age for secular and ecclesiastical codification, but the attitudes incorporated in these harsh laws presumably go back much earlier. Some early penitentials, as Keith Thomas has shown, make sodomy as serious as murder, or worse. To discount the anathemas of the leading spokesmen of Greek Christianity (Chrysostom) and Latin Christianity (Augustine) as somehow untypical of early Christian attitudes is an odd procedure, to say the least. Boswell ascribes the ferocity of Justinian's persecution (the one well-known early instance of law enforcement) solely to that testy emperor's personal bias and political animosities. But this is to miss the point that Justinian felt he was wearing the mantle of moral and religious respectability when he castrated bishops for this crime and marched them through the streets of Constantinople.

Boswell does admit that the Mediterranean world moved from tolerance of homosexuality in classical times to intolerance after the rise of Christianity. Concerned to get Christianity off the hook, he is perplexed to explain this. His proferred solution is that the ruralization of Europe after the fall of Rome caused the change, rural communities being, he thinks, less tolerant of sexual minorities than urban ones. (This, of course, overlooks the findings of Ford and Beach that preliterate societies have generally leaned to-

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wards toleration.) But Boswell finds it difficult to defend this theory in the light of the fact that Aquinas wrote and the Inquisition searched in a later age when urbanization was again the tendency. One would indeed like to think that the early Christian church had not fostered the hatred and fear that led to the later terrorism. But Boswell's arguments look too much like special pleading.

Reviewers have regularly applauded the scope and erudition of this book, and quite rightly. It uncovers hundreds of interesting and relevant new documents, theological and literary, hitherto unknown or unanalyzed, in an impressive range of languages. By placing intolerance towards gay people in the context of intolerance toward other minority groups in the middle ages—Jews, Moslems, lepers, etc.—it enlightens and stimulates. Even the prolific notes fascinate while they inform. It is exhilarating to see all this learning under control and marshaled to make significant points. Boswell's work will be an inexhaustible source and an inescapable point of departure for future scholars and apologists. It is a pity that it is, at the same time, vitiated by a determination to construe all its voluminous evidence in the light of an untenable leading idea.

A moral revolution

TOWARD A HUMANITARIAN DIPLOMACY
A PRIMER FOR POLICY
Edited by Tom J. Farer
New York University Press, $16, 229 pp.

BASIC RIGHTS
SUBSISTENCE, AFFLUENCE AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY
Henry Shue
Princeton University Press, $17.50, 231 pp.

CHURCH AND POLITICS
FROM THEOLOGY TO A CASE HISTORY OF ZIMBABWE
Enda McDonagh
University of Notre Dame Press, $12.95, 177 pp.

Robert F. Drinan

THESE important volumes, written before the Reagan administration announced the de-emphasis, if not the demise, of human rights as a crucial element of U.S. foreign policy, remind us of the spiritual treasures which we may have lost — perhaps permanently. Each of these volumes portrays a part of the memorable moral revolution that began in 1945 when all of the signatories of the United Nations Charter made a "pledge" to "promote" human rights. That agreement never meant very much to the United States until the Congress and President Carter made the period of 1974 to 1980 the golden age for human rights in American history.

The glories and the shortcomings of that period are analyzed in the five essays that make up *Toward a Humanitarian Diplomacy*. Rutgers Professor Farer, its editor and the Vice President of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights based in Costa Rica, sums up the message of the book in this way: "Placed beside the highest hopes of the human rights movement, Jimmy Carter is a modest figure. In the history books yet to be written, however, he might come to seem much greater . . ." Farer credits the Carter administration with "bringing about real electoral change in the Dominican Republic and the promise of democratic government in Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia and, perhaps, eventually in Brazil."

Mr. Farer also feels that "Carter's championing of human rights emboldened the Shah's opponents as it restrained the Shah's inclination towards an annihilating repression." Similarly Carter's "withdrawal of support for the Somoza dynasty plainly encouraged the Nicaraguan people's decision to stand up."

But the U.S. relationship to Iran analyzed by Marvin Zonis and America's tolerance of repression in Korea chronicled by Donald L. Ranard point up strongly the failure of the Carter administration to insist on the implementation of human rights when presented with an alleged clash with national security. A comprehensive treatment of recent U.S. relations with South Africa by John de St. Jorre reveals, however, the strength of the Carter administration's accent on human rights as does an essay by Sandy Vogelgesang outlining in fascinating detail the origins and objectives of a human rights policy which assumes and asserts that the advancement of our interests need not collide with the pursuit of our ideals.

The complexity of the problem of enforcing human rights is highlighted in Professor Shue's powerful study *Basic Rights*. It is his tenaciously argued thesis that the economic rights of the one billion absolutely poor people in the world "belong among the rights with the highest priority." Hence he would urge the present emphasis in U.S. policy on preventing and punishing torture and illegal detention should be shared by efforts to vindicate subsistence rights. With unrelenting logic Shue recommends that American law be broadened to require the termination of aid not merely to those governments that engage in shocking and outrageous conduct but to those countries indifferent to the rights of their citizens to food, shelter, and health care.

It is a thesis that is legally supportable and challenging. Even though its implementation cannot be foreseen in the near future, we should be grateful that Professor Shue has written the classical statement affirming that the rich nations are required by justice and by international law to share their abundance with those millions who are chronically malnourished.

Church and Politics was published in Ireland with a less pretentious and more descriptive title "The Demands of Simple Justice." Authored by an Irish priest who was a missionary in Africa and Rhodesia for many years, it seeks to apply the theology of a just war to the emergence of Zimbabwe. The manuscript was finished in November 1979 and hence does not cover the dramatic events surrounding the triumph of Robert Mugabe and the recognition of Zimbabwe on April 18, 1980.

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Using the Christian sources on the just war—all dubiously applicable in the atomic era—Father McDonagh concludes that "if one accepts the criteria of a just war as applying to a just revolution, the conditions for a just revolution were fulfilled, as far as they are ever likely to be, by the early 1970s in Rhodesia." Liberation theology also enters into Father McDonagh's reasoning and in his analysis of the church's role in Rhodesia. He writes eloquently about the origins of liberation theology in Latin America, applies it to the enslavement of the blacks in Rhodesia and states that "the absence of basic liberation contradicts the thrust of evangelisation. The exercise of evangelisation involves the work of liberation." But he is cautious almost to a fault in seeking to apply the two major Christian traditions of the just war and pacifism to the war in Zimbabwe. Because of this restraint Father McDonagh has constructed a balanced justification for a personal belief that the European priests who gave encouragement to the rebels in Rhodesia did not violate Christian tradition or teaching.

These three studies demonstrate the centrality of human rights today. They illustrate the fact that the religious and secular worlds in contemporary society share an ideology of human rights that unifies them and mutually reinforces their conviction and their courage in insisting upon respect for human rights. It is a remarkable convergence. Pope John Paul II in Brazil mentioned human rights more than any other concept. The work of Amnesty International brings together religionists and secularists.

These three volumes show consequently that when the Reagan administration downgrades human rights it is going against the strong tide of one of the most accepted moral ideas of this generation. These volumes thus reassure us that the universal contemporary faith in the majesty of human rights is an idea which, if it is going into eclipse at the moment, will emerge again to be the moral beacon of modern man.

The power of spiritual synthesis

STRUGGLE AND FULFILLMENT

Donald Evans

Fortress Press, $7.95, 256 pp.

FAITH, AUTHENTICITY AND MORALITY

Donald Evans

Univ. of Toronto, $25, 298 pp.

John A. Coleman

I FIRST MET Donald Evans last April at a symposium on Christian ethics at the University of Notre Dame. I was deeply impressed by his incisive analytic mind and his ability to cut through conceptual and linguistic muddles. Later, in personal conversation, I was touched by his energetic presence and the evident concern he exhibited for social issues of justice and peace. Moreover, he was *visibly* (not just in talk, talk, talk) a religious searcher, obviously adept *from experience* in contemplative techniques and deep prayer. He animated the truths he spoke about. I thought that, concerning him at least, it was appropriate to speak, as so many of my Berkeley friends rather loosely do, about someone having an "aura." I mention all this because Evans's two books claim that authentic human and religious fulfillment can, should and sometimes does bring about a change in personality which shows itself in a tangible bodily aura.

I first read *Struggle and Fulfillment* last June. Upon finishing it, I was led to reread one of my favorite George Herbert poems, *Aaron*, with its evocation of symphonic bells, ringing in harmony in head and heart and groin. Again, this was fitting since the book is fundamentally about integration: the integration of religion and morality; of the experienced presence of God and the void; of personal therapeutic liberation and social engagement; of psycho-analytic theory and practice and the life of moral virtue; of moral and ascetical theology; of contemplation and engaged action for justice.

While *Struggle and Fulfillment* and *Faith, Authenticity and Morality* can each stand alone, they are also so deeply inter-related (issued within a year of each other), mutually illuminating and complementary in tone and argument that, together, they present a rounded whole: a synthesis, an argument and a summons.

I was irritated in mid-summer by a brief notice of *Struggle and Fulfillment* carried in *The National Catholic Reporter*. While generally laudatory, the reviewer's tone tended to trivialize the significance of the book by suggesting that it was primarily a modern-day manual of piety (it is that in the best sense of the term), a mere restatement of classic wisdom and distillation of the human potential movement literature. The genius of *Struggle and Fulfillment* is that it is a contemporary spiritual classic—well-written and easily understandable—which, nevertheless, contains a controlled theological argument. The argument, however, aids rather than detracts from a struggle to find the "reasons" of the *heart*. The argument is subtle, scholarly, nuanced and, perhaps, hidden in a book that is so engaging.

Perhaps the best way to understand Evans's synthesis and argument is to turn, first, to *Faith, Authenticity and Morality*, the more technical—philosophically and theologically—of the two books. Based largely on earlier essays written during the last decade, it is, nonetheless, more than a mere assemblage. Having discovered he had been writing a book in these separate essays, Evans went back to re-edit them, add postscripts and new chapters. The result is a coherent, tightly argued book about foundations and apologetics in theology. The postscripts also serve as useful guides to the journey of a mind by indicating ways in which Evans has changed his mind from earlier positions and why, e.g. from those found in his earlier, much regarded and influential, book in moral theology, *The Logic of Self-Involvement*.

Faith, Authenticity and Morality deals with many issues in theology. Evans's treatment and illustration of the forms and uses of, and the relations between, different kinds of analogy may be the most concise original summary of this topic available anywhere. I found myself

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Babette Deutsch

The Photographs

Of one time or another, one place or another, of one person or several,
close kin, a few friends,
each lit by the memories that surround the figure like an atmosphere,
no more to be dismissed than an odor, a fragrance, as unique, as pervasive.
Often the face is smiling, but there are as many smiles
as there are faces, as diverse as the emotions greeting
the varieties of experience.
Sometimes the face frowns, or may show neither delight nor pain.
But again, whatever it shows, or seems to conceal, the feeling,
even the dismissal of feeling,
is various, like the smiles.
But one thing is certain: the photographs present a chief anguish
of old age, as they also offer one of its chief gifts.
For the anguish and the joy
are alike forever withheld upon the advent of him
whom Shahrazad called
the Destroyer of delight and Sunderer of societies,
the Plunderer of palaces.
the Caterer of cemeteries and Garnerer of graves.

John Humma

Mother, 71; Berchie, 93

Now it is a country all their own
and they are surely queen and queen mother of it.

They depend on the kindnesses of subjects,
who win thereby the portions of deserving

against the term of their own arthritic fall,
deafness, and sheer simple silliness. And whatever else.

Nature condones envy and spite but does not
reward courage and praise except with further life.

They have grown complementaries of infirmities and strengths:
one even wakes while the other sleeps,

as if by design (if design be will).
Since what has fallen out of the deck

is not all by feckless chance:
not the gathering to need, the rising to task.

Meanwhile, the house grows both darker and more dear,
inside and out. And if one cringes before

the last indignity, it is for the other's sake.

Dan Stryk

An Event

The old-timer grinned
as his wizened wife

paused to sniff lilac
along the library

walk. Starting in one
motion, they marched

on through the great
glass doors, a book

he'd read—and they'd
chosen—clutched

in his bony white claw.

Harry Humes

A Cold Condition

Fingers stiff shoulders caved-in
the mountain beyond made of silences
And someone walking beneath the poplars

I open doors turn corners
The stones
of the day gather near my blood

If I'm chilly it's a brass-handled landscape
gathers like zero near collar and wrist

Tomorrow when I stand by the posture
I've waited for year after year
I'll remember equators
of basement backyard coal bin tool box
the hands everyday on my hurt

On the clothes-line now an icy language flaps

Later there will be black
there will be celery sticks
there will be trays of small rememberings

All evening long
one woman will go on looking
into all the corners of the room
for a familiar season.

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marveling at his illuminating discussions of God's transcendence and immanence, providence, divine grace and human freedom, political theology, moral norms and situations, the relation of Christian faith to morality and what it means to speak of God at work in history. While no *summa theologiae, Faith, Authenticity and Morality* is a synthetic work of great originality. It successfully illustrates the moral significance of the anthropological turn in theology found in such thinkers as Marcel, Buber, and Karl Rahner.

The argument in the book, as I see it, is two-fold. First, Evans contends that it is possible to do a new apologetics which discloses the reasonableness of religion by showing that certain attitudes which are necessary for human fulfillment *logically* entail religious convictions. This is a variation, of course, of the Kantian argument which moves from respect for moral laws to the inference of a lawgiver. Evans, however, grounds his argument in different human attitudes than Kant. Evans's apologetics is no rationalism. The move is from attitude to conviction, not to *proof* for the existence of God. For him, the core of religion is to be found in lived attitudes rather than beliefs. Non-believers may be living a split. Their convictions belie genuinely religious attitudes. Similarly, believers may live out attitudes which effectively deny God. Evans calls his method in apologetics an anthropological-logical approach.

For Evans, the crucial arena for theology and theological ethics is to be found in theological anthropology. His is no reductionism of the transcendent. Revelation about God always (perhaps *primarily*) includes revelation about the human, and talk about authentic human fulfillment entails a disclosure of God. For the heart of human freedom (in Louis Dumont's helpful phraseology, the "encompassing" category of human freedom) is *receptive* freedom, responsive to God's initiative. This "heart" is different from that willful, self-initiated freedom which holds a legitimate, if subordinate, place.

The second point of the argument relates to Evans's shift from his earlier "enlarged empiricism" (drawing on the work of Ian Ramsey and rooted in the tradition of linguistic analytic philosophy) to an existentialist epistemology and stance. I am grateful that, in this important philosophic shift, Evans retains the key virtue of linguistic philosophers, i.e. one is almost always very certain about just what it is, precisely, he is talking about! There is little of the merely evocative muddle in the man. Evans's change to the existentialist mode is justified by his conviction (and experience) that certain participatory attitudes or existential stances are necessary conditions for discerning the presence and activity of God in history. In his discussions of subjectivity and objectivity or neutrality vs. value-laden presuppositions, he is nothing if not illuminating.

Faith, Authenticity and Morality focuses primarily on an ethics of being (virtue, character, attitudes) rather than an ethics of doing (norm, situation, rules). Moreover, it presents some subtle and helpful distinctions about Christian ethics. On the one hand, "Christian faith . . . involves acceptance of a moral vocabulary." Evans's argument here is complex. Religion is not the foundation of human morality. The latter enjoys a real autonomy. But morality, inasmuch as it entails *unconditional* demands, presupposes convictions concerning a cosmic grounding for the moral order. On the other hand, Christian faith has a moral criterion by which it can be judged. Moreover, authentic Christian faith (as a lived set of attitudes and virtues) illumines morality. Only the graced, the receptive ones, fully discern the authentic good.

In both *Faith, Authenticity and Morality* and *Struggle and Fulfillment* Evans presupposes that religion is a basic set of attitudes (note, not beliefs) and morality is a set of virtues. Their common ground and origin is "divine activity in authentically human individuals who are receptive." *Struggle and Fulfillment* exhibits in detail Evans's typology of eight basic attitude-virtues and vices. Evans does more than list and relate the virtues. His phenomenological method penetrates and discloses the realities of virtue and sin. Moreover, his extensive personal experience in therapy and meditative groups allows him to draw upon these rich resources to make his return to the classic discussion of virtues and vices novel, fresh, original, and supremely modern. He relates his own typology to the developmental scheme of Erik Erikson. The basic life-struggle (in religion, in morality, in virtue and the spiritual life) is one between attitudes of basic trust and basic distrust. Evans's treat-

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

Priorities in Biomedical Ethics
By James F. Childress is available at your local bookstore.

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ment of passion and apathy is especially rich—reminding one of Robert Solomon's recent brilliant book on the passions. Also of note is the realistic way Evans deals with human limits and finitude to avoid the excessive perfectionism to be found in most schemes of virtue and human fulfillment. He is throughout keenly aware of the dangers of self-deception and collective illusions.

I suspect that with the publication of these two books Evans will begin to have many disciples among North American Christian ethicists. He deserves to. His synthesis is so rich and fertile that it raises further questions and invites deeper probing and research. I took extensive notes on both books. A delight to read, they deserve careful study. *Faith, Authenticity and Morality* will occupy a permanent place in my library as a resource for thinking about theological ethics. *Struggle and Fulfillment* will stay closer to me at home as a deeply human spirit book that not only enlightened but summoned me to prayer.

Symbols, ceremonies, & political power

NEGARA

Clifford Geertz

Princeton Univ. Press, $18.50, 295 pp.

Michael Schudson

THE BOOK is forbidding. While the text is a mere 136 pages, it includes four maps and eleven diagrams and it is followed by 121 pages of notes, 8 pages of glossary, 22 pages of bibliography. The subject is nineteenth century Balinese politics, not one of the hottest topics on the intellectual circuit, nor one of the most accessible, even for anthropologists.

Still, the book is of general interest for the simple reason that it is written by Clifford Geertz, the most lucid, original, broad, and provocative of contemporary American anthropologists, perhaps of anthropologists anywhere in the world.

Geertz is a rare anthropologist indeed to have published original essays not only in the usual journals of his own discipline but to have written on art in *Modern Language Notes*, on common sense in the *Antioch Review*, on theater and games in *The American Scholar*, on trade and barter in *American Economic Review*, to note just a few of his recent efforts. He has reached far beyond disciplinary borders for an audience and has had a profound influence on sociology and history as well as anthropology. Still, he does not bask in the limelight but continues to produce professional monographic studies of both Indonesia and North Africa.

Of which this is one. I know little of Bali beyond what Geertz reports here and I cannot evaluate the astuteness of his ethnographic work. But here as elsewhere, Geertz has the knack for finding the world in a grain of sand, precisely because he seeks out social and cultural phenomena where people enact, dramatize, intensify, and revivify their sense of what the large world is and means.

Religion is sociologically interesting not because it mirrors the social order (which it does not) but because it shapes the social order.

"Negara" is the name for the "state" in nineteenth century Bali, a state peculiarly focused on ceremonialism and ritual. In Bali, as Geertz says, "power served pomp, not pomp power." Geertz teases here. While he confines this observation to Bali, he also means to attack directly the assumption of most Western political theory and social science that symbols and ceremonies of power are secondary to the main issue of social domination and material interests.

Geertz retells an anecdote of how the Dutch administrators of the south Celebes once called in two warring princes to straighten out the boundaries of their princedoms once and for all. The Dutch discovered that the princes fully agreed on what the boundaries were. But had they not fought over the land? One of the princes replied, "Mijnheer, we had much better reasons to fight with one another than these shabby hills." Geertz's task in *Negara* is to acquaint us with some of these better reasons and to suggest that we might well rethink and reinterpret the bases of our own politics too.

Most of *Negara* is an annotated guide to cliques and cleavages in nineteenth century Balinese society. Geertz discusses the divisions and links between gentry and peasantry, kinship groups, and political and economic patron-client relations. He tells us about local-level political administration (banjar), the irrigation societies (subak), and the temple organizations (pemaksan). The lesson is that Balinese social structure is complex. The membership of the banjar, subak, and pemaksan in any locale, for instance, did not coincide but intersected and overlapped, cutting across hamlets.

With this as background, Geertz moves on to the "perbekel" system by which local government was linked to the negara and within which different "houses" or lineages struggled for supremacy. This complex network of powers and allegiances cannot be aptly called bureaucracy or feudalism or patrimonialism. Nothing dreamt of in Max Weber's philosophy will do. There was no overall unitary government but a "knotted web of specific claims usually acknowledged." The negara was "a ceremonial order of precedence imperfectly impressed upon a band of sovereigns."

Then, the Westerner reasonably asks, what was there for the negara, the state, to do or to be? Not very much—and absolutely everything. "What the Balinese state did for Balinese society," Geertz writes, "was to cast into sensible form a concept of what, together, they were supposed to make of themselves: an illustration of the power of grandeur to organize the world."

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This is not as mysterious as it sounds but is a good deal more important than it may appear. Geertz here declares the state to be what elsewhere he has claimed for art, religion, ideology, common sense, and games—that it is a cultural system. For Geertz, the *negara* and the state ceremonials which were both its best expression and its reason for being, were "metaphysical theater." They expressed a view of the ultimate nature of reality and in so doing sought to shape life to conform to it. The theater of state ceremony tried to "present an ontology and, by presenting it, to make it happen—make it actual."

This repeats a familiar Geertzian formula. Art does not celebrate social structure or offer useful doctrine but "materializes a way of experiencing." Religion, for Geertz, formulates in symbols an image of the world that accounts for the puzzles and paradoxes of the human predicament—and it is sociologically interesting not because it mirrors the social order (which it does not) but because it shapes the social order. The Balinese cockfight's function is not to assuage or heighten social passions but "to display them" and so provide for the Balinese a self-interpretation.

Now Geertz tells us not only that religion and art and games are cultural systems but that the state (in Bali) is, too. The king in Bali was a corporeal god; the aim of king and court was to make themselves into facsimiles of the divine order. The palace was a replica down to the smallest detail of the universe itself and the human relation to it.

All of this is important to Westerners because, to make the most modest claim, Western political and social thought does not have categories or concepts adequate to understand the Balinese state. The larger claim is more provocative still—that whatever the peculiarities of Balinese politics, Balinese politics "like everyone else's, including ours" is *symbolic* action. Geertz makes this assertion in the final paragraph, tantalizing the reader to return to each previous paragraph and to wonder, is this also true of our politics? Is it true or sometimes true in our own politics that power serves pomp and not pomp power? Are we to

Children who have been neglected know no other way of life; discomfort, hunger, loneliness are the norm. And so, when they in turn become parents, this is the treatment they mete out to their children. Damaged children become damaged parents.

Damaged Parents

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Norman A. Polansky, Mary Ann Chalmers, Elizabeth Buttenwieser, and David P. Williams

Child neglect is less dramatic than child abuse–it is a private matter of things undone, of inaction compounded by indifference–yet it is even more widespread. This is the first book to explore the full dimensions of the problem including the social cost of the distortions of personality that child neglect produces. "Neglect," the authors write, "contributes to emotional illness, mental retardation, and a variety of physical handicaps. Less palpably but surely it tends to produce people whose ability to live independently is marginal, and who are *really unable to work productively during much of their lives.*" A national effort to control child neglect would be a matter of enlightened self-interest apart from its humanitarianism. Written with authority and compassion, and covering research, policy, and clinical aspects of treating this major social ill, DAMAGED PARENTS should have the impact on child neglect that THE BATTERED CHILD had on child abuse. $15.00

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keep interpreting our own politics as matters of power and economics only? Or do we share some of the obsession of the Balinese with status? For instance, is the recent Salvadoran escapade of the U.S. government just what I. F. Stone has suggested, a matter of "ego" and "macho" rather than of international power struggle? And is "display" its aim and not the means to some other end? And must we then rethink what we mean by politics?

Anthropology for Geertz is an interpretive study of the "texts" people create in their daily games and rituals, language and politics. *Negara* is a new interpretation of nineteenth century Bali. The reader who would like an introduction to Geertz would do better to read his *Interpretation of Cultures*. But *Negara*, too, shows breadth and boldness. Geertz does not casually title its last chapter, "Bali and Political Theory." He offers here not only an esoteric monograph but a challenge, a provocation to political thought.

Exploding bourgeois consciousness

SARTRE AND THE PROBLEM OF MORALITY

Francis Jeanson

Translated by Robert Stone, Jr.

Indiana University Press, $27.50, 384 pp.

JEAN PAUL SARTRE
PHILOSOPHY IN THE WORLD

Ronald Aronson

New Left Books, London (Schocken, N.Y.) $19.50, $9.95 (paper), 354 pp.

Joseph L. Walsh

THE DEATH of Jean Paul Sartre in the same year that Polish workers rose up and challenged their government while enjoying active support from much of the Communist party's rank and file is noteworthy and even fitting. Sartre's first systematic attempt to integrate existentialism and Marxism, *Search for a Method*, was written in 1957 at the invitation of Polish Marxist intellectuals. His popularity in Poland among rank-and-file party members contributed, along with other diverse influences including a vibrant Catholic intellectualism, to shaping there a humanist Marxist more able to hear and accommodate a movement like Solidarity than is the case elsewhere in Eastern Europe. It is not necessary to attempt any overall assessment of Sartre's influence in Poland, however, in order to have the events there remind us of what is arguably Sartre's major achievement—a view of human consciousness as able to rebel and reject its own personal and social past.

The publication of Francis Jeanson's *Sartre and the Problem of Morality*, and Ronald Aronson's *Jean Paul Sartre: Philosophy in the World* serves to remind us, in their very different ways, of the depth and power of that view of human freedom in Sartre and his tenacious affirmation of it over so many years and in diverse historical circumstances. Aronson, a professor at Wayne State University and trained in Brandeis University's History of Ideas program, has written a book with a familiar theme—viz., that as a Marxist, Sartre was hampered in articulating a positive view of society and political revolution by the lingering Cartesian individualism out of which he had fashioned his existentialism.

Aronson's formulation of this view is important nonetheless for the thoroughness with which he articulates it, particularly in his study of Sartre's literary as well as his social and political works. Aronson argues convincingly that the major preoccupation of Sartre's fiction, drama, and criticism is the lone individual consciousness confronting the problem of how to relate to the social world. For Aronson this is the literary correlative of Sartre's inability ever to see society as based on cooperation and communication and thus capable of an authentic socialist politics.

Authentic freedom is the moral imperative that carries the potential for an "explosion or rupture" or a "rent in being" with one's past and current existence.

Aronson's argument is strained at times, even going so far as to invent a crippling crisis in Sartre in the mid-1960s between his engaged (political) and alienated (existential/literary) selves. This is a view which is belied, however, by Aronson's own description of Sartre's continuing written and public productivity during this same period. Furthermore, the serious student will want to go to Mark Poster's *Existential Marxism in Post-War France* for a fuller account of Sartre's relationship to French Marxism and for a richer interpretation of the *Critique of Dialectical Reason*. But, Aronson's book makes a real contribution in persuasively demonstrating the real continuity between Sartre's literary and political writing which others have simply hypothesized.

Aronson fails nonetheless to grasp the full power of Sartre's existentialist view of freedom and its political significance. Here Francis Jeanson's *Sartre and the Problem of Morality (Le Problem Morale et la pensée de Sartre*, Paris 1947), superbly translated and annotated by Robert Stone of C.W. Post College, is welcome and helpful. Jeanson argues that Sartre is above all a moral thinker who views human consciousness as the freely chosen acceptance of the identity imposed on it from outside by society, others, and the body itself. Jeanson, whose book was acclaimed by Sartre himself at the time of its publication as having grasped the centrality of his thought, argues that there are two senses of freedom in Sartre. First, where consciousness chooses spontaneously or naturally to accept this imposed identity, and second, authentic freedom, where consciousness affirms or rejects this movement of natural or spontaneous freedom. For Jeanson, this exer-

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cise of authentic freedom is the moral imperative in Sartre which, if chosen by the individual, carries the potential for an "explosion or rupture" or a "rent in being" with one's past and current existence.

Jeanson has been criticized for an uncritical exposition of Sartre and there is indeed something limp in his simple acceptance of Sartre's view that authentic freedom, the source of "explosion and rupture," is its own justification—"it rests on nothing," "nothing justifies it from without." Jeanson and Sartre both seem to believe, however, that the affirmation of the ubiquitous possibility of authentic human freedom is a self-evident moral value in a world where human acquiescence in passivity is the chief evidence of moral nihilism.

Sartre capped his long career with a massive three-volume study of Gustave Flaubert entitled, *L'Idiot de la famille*. For Aronson this marked a retreat by Sartre from his post-1968 politics of engagement. Sartre himself described it as a political work despite its inaccessibility, as a work of bourgeois scholarship, to potentially revolutionary masses. In the light of Aronson's own framework, moreover, it is possible to see continuity between this work on Flaubert and the view enunciated by Sartre in *What Is Literature?* (1947): literature is a critical mirror in which the reader is led to recognize patterns of "dishonesty and evasion" which, upon reading, one can no longer hide from oneself. In Flaubert, Sartre wishes bourgeois society as a whole to see its patterns of dishonesty and evasion mirrored in this mid-nineteenth-century writer who so powerfully expressed the newly emerging bourgeois social order. For Sartre, the work on Flaubert is political insofar as it leads the bourgeois consciousness of its readers in disgust to an "explosion and rupture" with its former self.

It is of course possible for reasonable people to disagree about the desirability, even the possibility, of an explosive break of this kind within bourgeois society. But whatever may be the future of bourgeois society's consciousness in this regard, the recent events in Poland indicate that the capacity for such a break still exists somewhere among individuals and even whole societies in the modern world. Sartre's work and life-long commitments stand as his own powerful testament to his belief in that enduring hope and possibility.

The war mattered

WHITE SUPREMACY
A COMPARATIVE STUDY IN AMERICAN AND SOUTH AFRICAN HISTORY
George M. Fredrickson
Oxford University Press, $19.95, 356 pp.

Kathryn Marshall

Of the multiracial societies that resulted from European expansion between the sixteenth and twentieth centuries, the United States and South Africa have most obstinately upheld a belief in white supremacy. Both countries have made self-conscious efforts to establish white skin as a prerequisite for civil rights, and both have come close to pushing the notion of racial differentiation to its extreme and logical outcome: a *Herrenvolk* or master race society.

Nonetheless, the United States and South Africa have diverged radically in their official commitments regarding racial equality. In South Africa the doctrine of apartheid (literally, "apartness," or separation of the races) has been legally instituted and blacks have been disenfranchised; in the United States integration is the *de jure* policy and blacks are — in theory — full members of the civil community. For these reasons it is easy to imagine a note of moral smugness pervading any comparison, by an American, of the history of race relations in the two countries. But George M. Fredrickson, William Mason Professor of American History at Northwestern University and the author of two well-regarded studies in American history, does not moralize. Neither does he flatten history into a

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

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series of theoretical mirror images nor advance a preconceived formula to explain the complex relationship of economics and ethnic consciousness. Instead Fredrickson focuses on crucial aspects (some associated with specific periods, some with geography and geopolitics) of the evolution of white supremacy in the United States and South Africa, giving us a sustained analysis of similarities and differences.

The universalistic conceptions of human freedom on which the U.S. was founded were reaffirmed and institutionalized.

Both countries were settled in the early 1600's by northern European Protestants: the Dutch at the Cape of Good Hope, the British in Virginia. Dutch reactions to Cape indigenes, the Khoikhoi or "Hottentots," were shaped by earlier experiences of conquest in the East Indies, while British dealings with American Indians reflected Britain's claim to sovereignty over "barbarous" Ireland. The Dutch intended to establish a trading outpost, the British to build a civilization on the model of Europe; nonetheless — despite different motives for colonization — Dutch and British had similar attitudes toward the indigenous peoples. Both the Khoikhoi and the American Indian were regarded as inferior human specimens, and neither Dutch nor British wasted time in laying claim to the indigenes' territories. Nor did the British government in the American colonies or the Dutch (and later British) government in South Africa succeed in limiting white expansion into the interior.

By the early 1700's both the Cape and the American tidewater colonies had become slave societies. In each region whites relied on imported rather than indigenous labor; Americans bought West African slaves, while Cape colonists obtained slaves from East Africa, Madagascar, and the East Indies. Frederickson points out that the institution of racial slavery was intimately linked to tensions within the white social order, with the dehumanization of blacks creating a basis for inter-class unity among whites. For both the Cape and North American colonies were essentially frontiers, lacking the cohesiveness imparted by a metropolitan authority.

Like the United States, South Africa resisted British rule and pushed for independence, It went through phases of attracting immigrants from Europe and Asia, of exploiting its natural resources and of betraying black aspirations after a struggle for unification. But in South Africa the abolition of chattel slavery occurred early (1838) and industrialization occurred late (1890). The resulting pattern was one of integrating blacks into the industrial work force as the main source of labor but under conditions that kept them from acquiring economic or political leverage.

As Fredrickson makes clear, the ultimate goal of comparative history is to account for critical variables. In the case of the development of race relations in the United States and South Africa, one of these variables was demography. Another was geography and the possibilities it promised for economic expansion. Unlike South Africa, the North American colonies offered settlers millions of acres of rich soil as well as a system of rivers that provided access to the land and stimulated the growth of a market economy. While South Africa's Boers were wandering with their herds, Americans were clearing and cultivating, and it was this preoccupation with "Europeanization" which led, initially, to a more brutal dispossession of the indigenous population and finally to a more deeply entrenched determination to perpetuate black slavery. Yet the American Constitution prohibited denial of rights on grounds of race. The universalistic conceptions of human freedom on which the United States was founded were reaffirmed in the Civil War and institutionalized during Reconstruction. In other words — and Fredrickson stresses this — the Civil War mattered. For unlike

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the Afrikaner struggle for unification that came to final fruition in 1961, the American victory of northern over southern cause was inspired not by a sense of ethnic exclusiveness but by a commitment to equality.

White Supremacy, although dense with detail, is accessible to the lay historian. It is written largely without jargon and includes chronologies, footnotes, and an index.

Correspondence

(Continued from page 322)

couples use contraception in good conscience.

Finally, Mr. Doerflinger's argument that marriage would turn the priesthood into a part-time job doesn't quite square with his defense of marriage as a vocation. I presume he earns a living at something. Does this mean that marriage is, for him, a part-time job? The essential point is that unless a married clergy is permitted in at least some parts of the world, Catholics will not be able to attend Mass. A discipline which even conservative defenders of celibacy admit can be changed should never become more important than one of Christ's commandments.

REVIEWERS

LOUIS CROMPTON, *professor of English at the University of Nebraska, Lincoln, has published numerous essays on homosexual history. He is completing a book on Byron and homosexuality in nineteenth century England.*

FATHER ROBERT F. DRINAN, S.J., *is a professor of law at Georgetown's Law Center.*

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MICHAEL SCHUDSON *is associate professor of sociology and communications at the University of California, San Diego.*

JOSEPH L. WALSH *is associate professor of philosophy at Stockton State College in New Jersey.*

KATHRYN MARSHALL, *a novelist and journalist, has written about South Africa for* The Boston Globe *and* The Texas Observer.

Father Fitzgerald goes from my statement of fact to his conclusion that I take morality to be subjective. No; the point is rather that *Humanae Vitae*, like the assertion that Jews and Orthodox Christians are damned and the condemnation of usury (both of which were asserted with more solemn force than *Humanae Vitae*), is a temporary bad idea, one which is being ignored by millions. Too few have taken seriously Cardinal Hume's point that married people alone have received the grace of the sacrament of marriage, and should be consulted on matters pertaining to marriage.

JOHN GARVEY

'A mutual society'

Port Hope, Ontario

To the Editors: At this moment in preparing for marriage we are struggling with many of the peripheral concerns about our wedding described by Jo McGowan in her article, "Marriage versus Just Living Together" [Mar. 13]. I realize now that they are not insignificant but give the wedding its total shape.

We have not sat down, as author Jo and Ravi did, to analyze the activity going on in a wedding, but her expression of the community involvement of the event has been very helpful in keeping perspective at this time. We know that we are marrying to establish community — "a mutual society," as it is described in Anglican marriage services — and that means bringing all that "we are and all that we have" — friends and family together — as the community of our nurture and support.

Thank you for your observations; they have been food for our thought.

SUSAN GRAHAM

The war of 1939-45

Brooklyn, N.Y.

To the Editors: I read with interest the article of Thomas Powers on "Spasm War" [Mar. 27]. I agree with his conclusion regarding the First World War — it could have been avoided and the situation of Europe at its end was far worse than before it was fought. However, I cannot agree that the same argument can

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be used for the conflict of 1939-1945.

Although there was terrible suffering involved for millions of innocent people, far more was at stake than the sovereignty of Poland. If Hitler had conquered Britain he would have moved on to the Western Hemisphere and his policy of genocide would have wiped out millions more Jews, non-Caucasians, and other so-called "undesirables." He would have used the British Isles and Ireland as a springboard from which to mount his attack on Canada and the United States.

I also take issue with his statement "Britain had no hope of winning in June, 1940." I was there . . . Mr. Powers wasn't. We knew this was one time we could not surrender. We expected a miracle and it came . . . the Battle of Britain. *That* was the turning point for us.

JOAN M. COOPER

Embattled on two fronts

Cambridge, Mass.

To the Editors: Re: Your editorial, "More on Weapons" [Mar. 27]: The situation of being embattled on two fronts and seeking to prevent the destruction of the planet by all-out nuclear war has been my experience from the beginning of my involvement in these matters shortly after Hiroshima and Nagasaki. For global safety, there is an immense difference between the policy of having the minimum of secure nuclear weapons as a deterrent, with its all too apt acronym of MAD, namely, mutual assured destruction, as against the policy of first strike, which invites pre-emption on both the Soviet and American sides. There is likewise a difference between further technical advances in nuclear weaponry and instead a policy of emphasizing the importance of showing our own people that we are willing to make sacrifices to defend our country, by re-instituting the draft and improving the quality of our now semi-mercenary and concededly incompetent military, who cannot be trusted to handle the intricate problems of command and control of the nuclear weapons that will be placed in their possession under some of the more aggressive strategies now being contemplated for NATO.

Several weeks go, a friend of mine at a liberal arts college in New England invited Admiral LaRocque, a knowledgeable critic of our strategic policies vis-à-vis nuclear weapons, to speak at the college. My friend was attacked by some generals who attended the lecture and sat in the rear to hear the heresies of Admiral LaRocque, who has a long record of activity as someone who knows the danger of weapons from having been in the service. This very dedicated man was repeatedly assaulted from the audience by the purists who thought of themselves as on the righteous Left, attacking him as a murderer since he had once been in the military, and as a war criminal since he did not share their absolute pacifism. In the climate of such an encapsulated institution, this view could have hegemony; outside its gates, the students and faculty who took this position would naturally be regarded as pro-Communist, if taken seriously at all. Given the balance of opinion in the country as a whole, which the *Commonweal* editorial properly indicates, to demoralize the few people like Admiral LaRocque who are willing to take exposed positions may be comforting, but of course Admiral LaRocque would not have been in the situation at all had he not shared the concerns of his critics but differed from them, as I do, in his judgment as to what is feasible and hence genuinely moral.

The pure pacifist position is simple and requires little investigation of alternatives. Any departure from it requires that one inform oneself concerning the changing nature of weaponry; conflicts among the military services as to who is to possess what weaponry and detection; internal politics of the Soviet Union and of the United States, as each is affected by the behavior of the other. One has to make difficult judgments on such issues as human rights in the Soviet Union, previously discussed by me in these pages, the dangers of linking every objection we have to Soviet behavior with objections to the SALT II treaty which would provide both symbolic and substantive assurance of a continuing dialogue with those we now term barbarians, not realizing the degree of humiliation we impose on leaders of a country whose aristocracy once spoke French, on a society of whose evils we have become more aware thanks to the liberalization which has allowed some people to leave who would once have been killed or sent to the Gulag in silence.

DAVID RIESMAN
Department of Sociology
Harvard University

Worth nuclear war?

Scarsdale, NY

To the Editors: In "More on Weaponry" [Mar. 27] you say that nuclear weapons "make some kind of military sense," without offering support for your opinion. Can you describe a situation in which it would make sense to use these weapons? I said they make no military sense. Just before his death, Admiral Lord Mountbatten said:

> As a military man who has given half a century of active service I say in all sincerity that the nuclear arms race has no military purpose. Wars cannot be fought with nuclear weapons. Their existence only adds to our perils because of the illusions which they have generated.
>
> There are powerful voices around the world who still give credence to the old Roman precept — if you desire peace, prepare for

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war. This is absolute nuclear nonsense and I repeat—it is a disastrous misconception to believe that by increasing the total uncertainty one increases one's own certainty.

You agree with Secretary Haig that "there are some things that are worth fighting for." I said there is nothing worth fighting a nuclear war. Again an illustration of what you have in mind is in order. I simply cannot imagine the pretext or provocation that would warrant the undisputed civilization-shattering costs of nuclear warfare. Since you are so positive on this point, you must have clearly in mind some situation that would warrant our participation in such a cataclysmic encounter. W. H. FERRY

Justice & war

Cambridge, Mass.

To the Editors: It appears that the editors of *Commonweal* have not carefully pondered historical evidence. In your rubric, "More on Weaponry" [Mar. 27] you assert that ". . . justice has sometimes been achieved through force of arms, and peace preserved by the balance of power."

I wish to point out the invalidity of such an assertion. When in the name of God, has justice *ever* been achieved through force of arms? It is glaringly evident that our poor, oppressed sisters and brothers have remained so in spite of war. Clearly such altruistic motives as justice and honor mask subtler "forces" of conflict: material gains and power (ephemeral ends of mortal beings).

Secondly, I also invite you to test the validity of the second half of your assertion against the historical facts. When has peace been preserved by the balance of power? That type of thinking and belief in fact bring to mind Machiavelli and the War Department's (alias Department of Defense) repeated lamentations.

JOHN F. BUONCRISTIANI

The editors reply:

Mr. Buoncristiani bases an apparently absolute pacifism on his reading of history. We read history differently, including that of the 1930s and 1940s. Oppression has remained, despite the defeat of Nazism and its allies in World War II; but we believe, as Joan M. Cooper also argues in her letter, that a far greater degree of oppression would have resulted if the Third Reich had been permitted to complete the Holocaust, subjugate or eliminate the "inferior peoples" of Poland and Eastern Europe for purposes of *lebensraum,* and lead a Nazified West in what surely would have been an even more brutal and ruthless effort to maintain domination over the colonized world. The war against Nazi domination of our civilization was a just war. However, even that war, with all the grave injustices committed in its course and in its conclusion, need not have been fought if the Western democracies had succeeded in maintaining the balance of power, through force of arms when necessary, in the late thirties. One contributing factor to the West's failure was the denigration, by pacifists among others, of notions of "justice" and "honor" as *always* and *entirely* ideological masks for material interests. Because we disagree with that denigration, we admitted that Secretary Haig was right in the simple statement that "there are things that are worth fighting for."

Mr. Ferry considerably, and legitimately, complicates these questions by referring specifically to *nuclear* war and *nuclear* weapons. The problem is that he only considers the actual *use* of these weapons and the *waging* of such a war. It is, however, the *threat* posed by these weapons—which has indeed prevented direct conflict between the superpowers for over three decades—that leads us to say, with obvious qualification, that they "make *some kind* of military sense." Leaving aside the question of so-called tactical nuclear weapons, Mr. Ferry is correct in pointing to the total illogic of actually destroying civilization in order to save it. But what of running the *risk* of such a terrible conflagration in the belief (1) that this is, at the moment, the only way to preserve crucial values (like freedom); (2) that furthermore it stands a good chance of preventing the actual use of such weapons; and (3) that finally it buys time for the only realistic escape from the dangers of nuclear weapons, a process of mutual nuclear control and disarmament? That is the case for deterrence. How politically and morally tenuous it is can only be judged in comparison with the alternatives. That is what, it seems to us, Professor Riesman has been doing in his decades-long advocacy of feasible steps toward nuclear detente and sanity. THE EDITORS

Register footballs!

Ft. Worth, Tex.

To the Editors: Thanks to writer Don B. Kates for pointing out what gun owners have been saying for years: That gun laws are, inevitably, enforced against the law-abiding almost exclusively [Mar. 13]. As an example, all felons apprehended carrying guns could be prosecuted under the 1968 Gun Control Act. But few if any have been prosecuted. Instead, gun collectors and dealers have been shot, beaten, and their guns confiscated by federal gun agents often acting on little more than hearsay.

Only two hundredths of one percent of handguns are used in crime. That's one pistol in five thousand. It should have been pointed out that by far and away, the majority of pistols are used lawfully and in the best interests of public safety. Fully forty-five things and activities, including stairs, bikes, basketball, and football, are listed as "more dangerous" than handguns by the Federal Consumer Product Safety Commission.

(DR.) GRIFFIN T. MURPHEY

Church/world watch

(Continued from page 330)

The function of such a diplomatic initiative would be simply to set the context in which a stable internal regime could be negotiated in Lebanon. No long term resolution is realistic without an address to the Palestinian question, but direct diplomatic action in Lebanon cannot wait for the Palestinian issue. The Habib mission has the short-term immediate goal of avoiding war; but U.S. diplomatic objectives will have to be broader than damage limitation. The same effort, with the kind of high level commitment the Habib mission symbolizes, needs to be placed behind a positive political effort in Lebanon. J. BRYAN HEHIR

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